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SHOULD FEDERALISM SHIELD CORRUPTION?MAIL FRAUD, STATE LAW AND POST-LOPEZ
ANALYSIS
George D. Brownt
I.
INTRODUCTION-PROTECTION THROUGH PROSECUTION?
There is a view of state and local governments as ethically-challenged backwaters,' veritable swamps of corruption in need of the ultimate federal tutelage: protection through prosecution. Whether or
not the view is accurate, the prosecutions abound. 2 Many metropolitan newspapers have chronicled the federal pursuit of errant state and
local officials. 3 The pursuit is certain to continue. In the post-Watergate period, the Justice Department has made political corruption at
all levels of government a top priority.4 A vigorous federal presence in

t Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Boston College Law School. A.B. 1961,
Harvard University, LL.B. 1965, Harvard Law School. Chairman, Massachusetts State Ethics Commission. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not in
any way represent the position of the Commission. Research for this Article was supported
by a grant from the Boston College Law School Dean's Fund. The author wishes to thank
his colleagues for their helpful comments arising from a presentation of an early version of
this Article at a Boston College Law School Faculty Colloquium. In addition, many of the
author's friends and colleagues read various drafts of the manuscript during its progression. This author hopes that the changes from earlier drafts reflect adequately the constructive comments made.
1 See, e.g., Michael Kinsley, The WitheringAway of the States, NEw REPUBLiC, March 28,
1981, at 17, 21 (listing examples of state and local government corruption). Mr. Kinsley
states that we need not "do anything so drastic as abolishing the states. They could remain
as reservoirs of sentiment and employers of last resort for people's brothers-in-law." 1d.at
21. For a recent academic treatment reflecting a similar perspective, see generally Edward
L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a NationalNeurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv.
903 (1994) (rejecting federalism as a norm of governance).
2 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraudand the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to
Watch Over Us, 31 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 153, 154 (1994) ("As of December 31, 1990, 1561 state
and local officials awaited trial.").
3
Brian C. Mooney, Crux ofFederalProbe: What Is Corruption?, BOSrON GLOBE, July 22,
1995, at 1 (analyzing federal investigation of the Speaker of the Massachusetts House of
Representatives);John Sullivan, Mayor'sAide in Newark Is Indicted,N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 26, 1996,
at B1 (reporting federal indictment of top aide to Mayor of Newark, NewJersey).
4 See Moohr, supranote 2, at 154 ("For the past twenty years, the federal government
has tried to secure good government by prosecuting state and local public officials for
public corruption.").
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this area-including prosecution of state and local officials-is widely
supported by observers of the federal criminal justice system. 5
There is, however, a fundamental tension between these prosecutions and one of the important intellectual, political, and judicial currents of our time: the renewed interest in curbing national authority
in favor of state and local power. Whether this perspective is labeled
"devolution,"6 "the new federalism," 7 or "dual sovereignty,"s it is a
driving force in the debate over issues as diverse as welfare reform, 9
crime control, 10 voter registration," aild term limits. 1 2 Many on the
devolutionist side find constitutional support for their position not
only in the original document and the Tenth Amendment,' 3 but also
in recent decisions of the Supreme Court, especially United States v.
Lopez.14
The message of Lopez is that the powers of the national government are limited in fact as well as in theory. Evoking "first principles,"
ChiefJustice Rehnquist emphasized that " [t]he Constitution creates a
Federal Government of enumerated powers"' 5 and posited the goal of
"'a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government."1 6 The Lopez Court demonstrated a renewed willingness to
read the Commerce Clause as containing its own internal limits.17 An
5 E.g., G. Robert Blakey, Federal CriminalLaw: The Need, Not for Revised Constitutional
Theory or New CongressionalStatutes, but the Exercise of Responsible ProsecutiveDiscretion, 46 HAsTINGS L.J. 1175, 1206 n.67 (1995).

6

E.g., Wilfred M. McClay, A More Pefect Union? Toward a New Federalism, COMMEN-

TARY, Sept. 1995, at 28, 29-30 (discussing concept of devolution).

7 E.g., Richard C. Reuben, The New Federalism, A.BA. J., Apr. 1995, at 76.
8 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Dueling Sovereigntie. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 109 HAnv. L. REv. 78, 104 (1995) (discussing debate over role of Supreme
Court "as defender of state sovereignty against federal encroachment").
9 See, e.g., Kenneth B. Noble, Welfare Revamp, Halted in Capital, Proceeds Anyway, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1996, at 1 (reporting state changes to welfare program while federal efforts
appear stalled).
10 See, e.g., House Refuses to Restore Crime PreventionFunds, BosroN GLOBE,July 27, 1995,
at 16 (debate over Republican efforts to convert 1994 crime control legislation into block
grant).
1 See Reuben, supranote 7, at 79 (discussing California Governor Pete Wilson's challenge to the federal "motor voter" law).
12 See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 81 (analyzing the Court's 1995 decision on term limits
as "best read as a preview of the Court's response to other coming controversies over the
relative reach of state and federal power").
13 See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 7, at 76 (stating that conservatives view the Tenth
Amendment as "embod[ying] the founders' promise for a nation in which the states and
federal government are near-equal partners").
14 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
15 Id. at 1626.
16 Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
17 By "internal limits" I mean the notion that Congress's various powers, granted in
Article I, section 8, are both enumerated and limited. If Congress attempts to utilize a
specific enumerated power to reach a subject matter beyond the scope of that power, the
Court will strike it down as exceeding that power's internal limits. This concept is particu-
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important aspect of Lopez is that it struck down a federal criminal statute.' 8 The Court stressed that "[u] nder our federal system, the 'States
possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal
law."' 19 Like the gun law at issue in Lopez, federal prosecutions of state
and local officials present a heightened risk of upsetting the "healthy
balance" between the state and federal systems, albeit for different
reasons. After Lopez, the Court is sure to examine whether the statutory authority to undertake such prosecutions is within the "limited"
authority of Congress.
In this Article, I use the term "post-Lopez analysis" to encompass
both external limits on congressional power and internal limits such
as those at issue in Lopez. Indeed, the invocation of Lopez becomes an
additional, somewhat symbolic, statement as to the importance of federalism. Recent decisions of the Court, as well as opinions of individual justices, represent a renewed interest in the vitality of a dualsovereignty approach to constitutional issues. The Court has become
increasingly willing to narrow20 or strike down 21 national laws infringing upon state interests. In particular, New York v. United States22 resurrects the notion of external, federalism-based limits on Congress's
exercise of enumerated powers. In that case, the Court held that Congress cannot "commandeer" the regulatory authority of state legislatures.2 3 To the extent that there are external limits on the national
government, a federal prosecution of state officials who make and enforce state law seems a strong candidate to trigger them. A government that cannot commandeer states perhaps cannot police them
either.
In this Article, I will examine the issues that federal prosecutions
of state and local officials pose. The analysis focuses on prosecutions
larly important in the context of the Commerce Clause, which the Court had previously
interpreted in a seemingly unlimited fashion. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL, CONSTTUONAL LAw 132-34 (2d. ed. 1991) (dis-

cussing "[e]nforcing enumeration as a limitation on power"). "External limits" are constraints upon congressional action that have their source in some provision or principle of
the Constitution other than the power Congress seeks to exercise. See Sullivan, supra note
8, at 105-06 (discussing possible revival of external limits analysis after the Court's decision
in U.S. Term Limits Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S.Ct. 1842 (1995)). See generally STONE ET AL.,
supra, at 139 (discussing distinction between internal and external limits).
18 The statute was the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
For a discussion of the scope of federal criminal law, see infra Part II.
19 Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631 n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635
(1993)).
20
See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (narrowing the scope of the Age
Discrimination and Employment Act as applied to appointed state judges).
21 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); United States v. Lopez,
115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
22 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
23
Id. at 176 (citation omitted).
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under the mail fraud statute. 24 This broad statute, prohibiting use of
the mails in connection with "any scheme or artifice to defraud," 25 has
emerged as one of the federal prosecutors' major weapons in the war
against political corruption. 2 6 The Supreme Court has already tried
once to limit it,27 relying in part on federalism grounds. 28 Congress,
however, rebuffed the Court by amending the statute in an effort to
make clear that it applies to state governmental matters. The amendment added to the general ban on fraud a prohibition on any
"scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services. '29 Read broadly, this language confers a set of federal
rights to good government at the state and local level; citizens cannot
be deprived of these rights by any fraud that uses the mails. In this
Article, I contend that the statute in its present form raises substantial
questions, especially in the post-Lopez environment. Constitutional
and policy issues concerning the proper scope of federal criminal
law-substantial ones to begin with-are particularly sensitive when
the defendants are state and local officials.
Part II of the Article considers the mail fraud statute within the
context of the general debate over the proper scope of federal criminal law.30 This ongoing debate may provide impetus for re-examination of the statute, particularly given the sensitive issues that
prosecutions of state officials raise. While many observers view prosecution of state and local corruption as a desirable component of federal criminal jurisdiction, 3 1 several justices of the Supreme Court have
called for its curtailment on federalism grounds.3 2 Moreover, the mail
24
25

18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
Id.

26
See, e.g., Moohr, supranote 2, at 154 & n.6 (citing figures detailing extensive reliance on mail fraud statute, but also noting use of other statutes).
27 See McNally v. United States, 488 U.S. 850 (1987).
28 See id- at 360 ("Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer
boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope

29 The Amendment provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or
artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right
of honest services." Anti-DrugAbuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat.
4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994)).
30 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principlesto Define the Proper
Limits for Federal Criminaljurisdiction,46 -ASTINGS L.J. 979, 983-88 (1995) (discussing the
effects of expanded federal criminal jurisdiction on the workload of federal courts); Kathleen F. Brickey, CriminalMischief. The Federalizationof American CriminalLaw, 46 HASTINGS
LJ. 1135, 1148-65 (1995) (discussing impact of the war on drugs on the federal judicial
system); Rory K. Little, Myths and Principlesof Federalization,46 HASINGS LJ. 1029, 1038-47
(1995) (expressing doubt over the validity of concerns about federal judges' workload).
31

See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE

FEDERAL COURTS
32
See Evans

25 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]; Blakey, supra note 5;.
v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 290-94 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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fraud statute has often been the object of scrutiny and criticism. 3 3 For
example, recent court of appeals decisions reflect unease with its po34
tentially broad scope.
The question arises whether a re-examination of mail fraud
would focus on constitutional or statutory issues. Parts III and IV address the former. Prior to Lopez, analyses of federal criminal law assumed that the basic issue of national power was settled,3 5 but the
premise of this Article is that all bets are off. Part III examines the
question of internal limits on the mail fraud statute as an exercise of
the power "[t] o establish Post Offices and Post Roads."3 6 The principal argument for constitutionality is that Congress may exclude from
the mail matters that it lacks the power to regulate in general.3 7 One
might expect Lopez to cast doubt upon such analysis. However, Lopez's
treatment of the Commerce Clause suggests that this view of the Postal Power retains its validity. To the extent that the question remains
open, however, it is useful to explore alternative sources for congressional authority to enact a broad statute dealing with state and local
corruption. I therefore consider the theses that the Guarantee
Clause 38 is a possible source,3 9 and that corruption at any level threat40
ens the national government's own well-being.
Nationalist premises like these sounded a lot more convincing
prior to Lopez and other recent federalism decisions. Part IV, therefore, considers whether one can derive from the Court's jurisprudence federalism-based external limits on whatever national power
over state and local corruption would otherwise exist. I am not suggesting a direct application of Lopez itself. Rather, the question is one
of post-Lopez analysis in the broad sense and of judicial enforcement

33 See, e.g., PeterJ. Henning, Maybe It ShouldJust Be CalledFederalFraud:The Changing
Nature of the Mail FraudStatute, 36 B.C. L. Rrv. 435 (1995); Moohr, supra note 2, at 187-99;
Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. REv. 223, 267-70 (1992).
34 See United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 730 (1st Cir. 1996) (requiring intent to
influence official action in addition to violation of state statutes to establish honest services
mail fraud); United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1436-37 (5th Cir.) (holding that
§ 1346 is not sufficiently clear to overturn McNally and reinstate honest services doctrine),
rehg en bane granted, 91 F.3d 676 (1996).
85
E.g, Blakey, supra note 5, at 1176 (rejecting discussion of federalization as "asking
the wrong question.... That is a constitutional question to which we now have a fairly
clear constitutional answer.").
386 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
37 See infra text accompanying notes 214-23.
38 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government .... "
39 See Adam H. Kurland, The GuaranteeClause as a Basisfor FederalProsecutions of State
and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L REv. 3869 (1989).
40 See infra text accompanying notes 117-33.
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of federalism values. 4 1 Part IV focuses on New York v. United States1 2
and the concept of limits on Congress's power to control state and
local government. I find in New York and its invocations of accountability a broader ideal of substantial political autonomy for states. 43
Federal prosecutions of state officials for governing badly clash with
this ideal.
My conclusion is that the inquiry into congressional power to enact the mail fraud statute in its current broad form ends in a tie. The
result is a dilemma. On the one hand, federal prosecutions of state
and local officials bring to justice many perpetrators of serious corruption.44 They rest on seemingly accepted constitutional premises. On
the other hand, those premises are, in the post-Lopez world, 45 open to
reconsideration. The mail fraud statute, in particular, with its seemingly open-ended prohibition of bad government, is especially intrusive on federalism values. The policy issues are not open and shut
either. Federal prosecution of state officials indicates that the state is
not rectifying its own problems. Yet any long-term solution to faults
within a particular political culture will probably have to come from
46
that culture itself, notably the electorate.
In Part V, I offer a possible resolution of the dilemma: state law as
the primary source of any duties enforced by federal mall fraud prosecutions. The mail fraud statute, as amended in response to the
Supreme Court's decision, deals with the general issue of "good government."47 Rather than a wide-ranging federal right to good government, created and defined by the federal judiciary, why not look to
the myriad of state laws governing ethics and related matters? Such
laws exist in almost every state. There are other examples of federal
41
The availability ofjudicial enforcement is a critical element of this analysis. Thus,
the concurring opinion in Lopez ofJustices Kennedy and O'Connor plays a central role in
the post-Lopez environment. Justice Kennedy emphasized the need for judicial review to
protect federalism and compared this role of the Court with enforcement of other "structural elements in the Constitution, separation of powers, checks and balances, [and] judi-

cial review .

. . ."

United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1637 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring).
42
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
43
See Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces ofFederalism: Findinga Formulafor the Future,
47 VAND. L. REv. 1563, 1570-75 (1994).
44 See Moohr, supra note 2, at 185-87 (discussing pragmatic justifications for federal
prosecutions of state and local officials).
45
Part of the importance of Lopez is that it adds to the momentum of devolutionary
developments occurring across the governmental and intellectual spectrums. Many settled
matters are now open to question. Because of its prominence and sensitivity, the extensive
federal role in prosecuting state and local officials is highly likely to be one of those
matters.
46 Moohr, supranote 2, at 186.
47
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994) refers to "honest services" without specifying that it applies
to the public sector. See id. at 169. However, the legislative history, although not extensive,
appears to establish that Congress intended to reach misconduct by public officials. See id.
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criminal statutes using state law to provide the governing standard,
even in the anti-corruption field. 48 Close examination of the mail

fraud cases reveals that federal courts often make extensive use of
state law, even when they disclaim any need to refer to it. This extensive use of state law provides empirical support for the theoretical considerations advanced here. It represents a de facto recognition by the
federal courts of the important federalism issues at stake.
There is, however, a serious question as to whether it is possible
to read the mail fraud statute this way. Congress added the honest
services language in response to McNally v. United States,49 a Supreme
Court decision that rested in part on federalistic premises. The Court
attempted to limit mail fraud prosecutions of state and local officials; 50 Congress subsequently endorsed those prosecutions and ap-

pears to have authorized a federal standard to govern them.5 1 To
overcome this significant hurdle, I explore the possibilities of "clear
statement" analysis. This approach to statutory construction requires
Congress to use a high degree of specificity before a court will interpret a national norm as infringing upon state prerogatives. In Gregory
v. Ashcroft,52 the Court elaborated on the federalistic bases of this approach. 53 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recently held
that principles of clear statement prohibit applying the honest services
doctrine to state and local officials. 5 4 I explore a partial application,
reading the statute as covering the services of state and local officials,
but not providing a federal standard to define honest services. However, any invocation of the clear statement approach is vulnerable as
an attempt to reinstate McNally after Congress overruled it. Instead, I
recommend a modified "federal common law" approach: borrowing
state law to give content to a federal norm.

48
See, e.g., The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (2) (1994) (punishing, under certain
circumstances, "extortion [or] bribery... in violation of the laws of the State in which
committed..."). For incorporation of state law in a different context, see 18 U.S.C. § 1955
(1994) (prohibiting gambling operations in violation of state law).
49 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
50 See id. at 356-60.
51 See Moohr, supra note 2, at 169.

52

501 U.S. 452 (1991).

See i at 460-61.
54 See United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1436-37 (5th Cir.), reh'g en bane granted,
91 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1996).
53
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II
MAIL FRAUD AND THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW DEBATE-Is
THIS STATUTE DIFFERENT?

A.

Federal Criminal Law-The Current Debate

The first step in the analysis is to place the mal fraud statute in
context. There is an extensive body of federal criminal statutes, as
many as three thousand, according to an oft-cited estimate. 55 The
scope of these statutes runs directly contrary to classical notions of
federal law as "interstitial"5 6 and of the states as occupying the primary
role in criminal matters. 57 In criminal law, the current model is best
described as one of concurrentjurisdiction. 58 Congress's ongoing desire to add to this defacto national criminal code has led two experts to
state that "the trend in federal criminal laws increasingly is moving in
the direction of duplication of the state criminal codes." 59 Indeed, it
is possible to put aside distinctions between levels of government and
to view the entire array of criminal law and administration in the
60
United States as a single system.
The development of a substantial body of federal criminal law
has, however, engendered vigorous criticism, particularly among academics andjudges. 6 1 Professor Sanford Kadish, for example, refers to
"creeping and foolish federal overcriminalization." 62 Critics focus on
this development's effect on the federal courts and on the federal system generally. They see a real risk that criminal cases will engulf the
federal courts.65 The resultant danger is that limited federal judicial
resources will be diverted from the core functions of federal courts:
constitutional adjudication, review of federal administrative agencies,
55 See Beale, supra note 30, at 980 (citing RogerJ. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the
Federal Courts, 43 SYRAcusE L. REv. 681 (1992)).
56

See RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WEcHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND

THE FEDERAL SysTEm 521 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WEcHSLER].
57 See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 n.3 (1995).

58 See, e.g., Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, ProsecutorialDiscretionand the Federalization Debate, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 967, 971 (1995).
59 NoRmAN ABRAms & SARA SUN BEAT , FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND rrs ENFORCEMENT
45 (2d ed. 1993).
60 See Blakey, supra note 5, at 1176 n.4 (quoting ChiefJustice William H. Rehnquist,
Welcoming Remarks: National Conference on State-FederalJudicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. Rnv.

1657, 1658 (1992)). Professor Blakey views the question of how to make that system function in the most rational manner as more important than theoretical discussions of federalism. 1d. at 1176-77.
61 See, e.g., Beale, supranote 30; RogerJ. Miner, FederalCourts, FederalCrimes andFederalism, 10 HARv.J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 117, 124-28 (1987).

62

Sanford H. Kadish, Comment: The Folly of Ovefederalisation,46 HASTINGS LJ. 1247,

1248 (1995).

63 See Beale, supra note 30, at 984-88. Drug cases, in particular, can overwhelm trial
dockets. See Brickey, supra note 30, at 1153-56.
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interstate matters, and complex civil litigation. 64 As for federalismbased critiques, there is both a functional objection to duplicating
state resources and a doctrinal concern with displacing the states'
traditional primary role in criminal matters. 65 Not everyone agrees
that there is a criminal caseload crisis in the federal courts, 6 6 or that
the doctrinal questions are terribly important.67 Even the critics of
the critics, however, are willing to take a hard look at the growth of
68
federal criminal law.
The fundamental issue in the federal criminal law debate is
whether it is possible to formulate general principles of federal criminal jurisdiction. Can we delineate, a priori, what cases belong in federal court? There have been numerous efforts to do S0. 69 Judge
Stanley Marcus has offered the following criteria for delineating federal criminal jurisdiction:
1) crimes against the United States itself, i.e., against its treasury or
its officers, or on its property;
2) criminal enterprises that by virtue of their scope and magnitude
spill across interstate and/or international boundaries, e.g., international narcotics cartels;
3) crime that is essentially intrastate, where the scope is so great
that there is a need for federal resources and concurrent jurisdiction is justified, e.g., large bank fraud cases;
4) enforcement of the rights of insular minorities, e.g., civil rights
cases;
5) systematic and pervasive corruption of the local system, e.g., Opinvestigation of corruption of the Cook
eration Greylord, the
70
County court system.
Formulating meaningful criteria that separate effectively those
cases that "belong" in the federal criminal system from those that do
not is no easy task. Part of the problem is identifying federal interests
thatjustify a partial displacement of state criminal law. In addition, as
Professor Rory K. Little has noted, " [i] t may be that no language can
capture the principles we want to apply, without being so generalized
Beale, supra note 30, at 988-90.
See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 290 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Beale, supra note 30, at 993-96.
66
See Little, supra note 30, at 1038-47.
67
See Blakey, supra note 5, at 1176-77 (criticizing symposium on federalization of
crime for "asking the wrong question").
68
See id. at 1216-17 n.91; Little, supra note 30, at 1063-70.
69
See Rene M. Landers, Reporter' Draftfor the Working Group on the Mission of the Federal
Courts, 46 HAsnNGs LJ. 1255, 1260-63, 1265 n.77 (1995) (summarizing the formulation of
principles for federal criminal jurisdiction by Professor Kathleen Sullivan, Judge Stanley
Marcus, and Senator Joseph R Biden).
70
Sara Sun Beale, Reporter's Draftfor the Working Group on Principlesto Use When Considering the Federalizationof Criminal Law, 46 HASINGS LJ. 1277, 1296 (1995).
64
65
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as to be useless as a practical matter."7 ' As an alternative, he recommends a "rebuttable presumption against federalization"7 2 and a requirement of "demonstrated state failure"7 3 before the federal
criminal law can come into play.
B.

Federal Criminal Law And Political Corruption-The Search
For Federal Interests

It is not clear whether it is possible to formulate and apply principles of federal jurisdiction given the extensive overlapping between
federal and state criminal laws that now exists.7 4 What is important
for purposes of this Article, however, is that even analysts with widely
differing views on the scope of federal law agree that prosecutions of
state and local officials for corruption belong within federal jurisdiction. Judge Marcus's fifth criterion states this explicitly,7 5 as do other
analyses, including the Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts of the
Judicial Conference of the United States.7 6 Rationales, however, differ. Some analysts apparently view corruption as analogous to violations of civil rights.7 7 Others see it as a breakdown in basic
governmental institutions.7 8 Political corruption may represent a
form of white collar crime7 9 or it may be related to organized crime.8 0
Both of these are fields within which an active federal role has long
been accepted. Professor Little's principle of demonstrated state failLittle, supra note 30, at 1077.
Id. at 1071.
73
Id. at 1078.
74
Professor Little raises the question of whether the federalization debate should return to "first principles" and treat all questions about the reach of federal law as open. M
at 1072.
75
He refers to "systematic and pervasive corruption of the local system." Beale, supra
note 70, at 1296. Although he cites an example of corruption in the local courts, I believe
that he is referring to political corruption generally.
76 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 31, at 25. The plan lists the following as one of the
types of offenses to which Congress should allocate federal criminal jurisdiction: "The
proscribed activity involves serious, high-level or widespread state or local government corruption, thereby tending to undermine public confidence in the effectiveness of local prosecutors and judicial systems to deal with the matter." Id.
77
See Beale, supra note 70, at 1296 (listing Professor Sullivan's fourth basis for federal
prosecution as "where the 'states are unable or unwilling to face the problem, as in the case
of the enforcement of the civil rights statutes").
78 The 1995 Judicial Conference Plan for the Federal Courts invokes "public confidence in the country's system of justice." LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 31, at 25. As
developed below, the issue can be viewed more broadly as a matter of the public's confidence in government in general. See infra text accompanying notes 125-28.
79 See Blakey, supra note 5, at 1206 n.67 (treating political corruption prosecutions as
an aspect of the Justice Department's white-collar enforcement activities).
80
Cf id. at 1198 ("[Olrganized crime is thus the most sinister kind of crime in
America. It subverts the character of American institutions as well as the character of its
individuals.")).
71

72
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ure will often justify federal prosecution of state and local
corruption.8 1
These differing rationales reflect the general assumption that the
debate over the scope of federal criminal law is one of policy only; all
constitutional issues are settled.8 2 In the post-Lopez environment, however, this view is no longer valid. Principles of state sovereignty may
impose limits on prosecutions of state and local officials. Whether the
issue is viewed as one of policy only, or of enforceable constitutional
constraints, I think it is important and useful to identify potential federal interests. That is, what concerns of the national government can
justify that government's prosecution of state officials for misconduct
in office?
The civil rights context presents a clear example of the requisite
interest. Whenever national law has created rights against state and
local officials, or their parent bodies, logic dictates that national
courts and prosecutors be available to further the federal interest in
their enforcement. For example, as one analyst of federal criminal
law notes, "[I]n the case of discrete minorities, the federal government has special enforcement responsibilities under the Civil War
Amendments." 83 However, the same analyst writes that "[i]n the presence of discrimination or pervasive corruption, federal officials may no
longer defer to state and local authorities, and political checks on the
behavior of local officials are of doubtful value." 84 The leap from discrimination to corruption is a substantial one. Concern for disfavored
classes and specific rights becomes a more generalized concern about
the equitable and efficient functioning of institutions.
Indeed, the scope of the federal civil rights criminal jurisdiction
is itself open to question. In the current term the Supreme Court will
have a significant opportunity to clarify that scope as well as the relationship of the jurisdiction to political corruption. In United States v.
Lanier,8 5 a state judge was found guilty of misusing his position by
committing sexual assaults against litigants and court employees.8 6
The federal government prosecuted Judge Lanier under 18 U.S.C.

81 See Little, supra note 30, at 1079 & nn.241-42. Professor Little would require a
particularized inquiry into any proposed federal intervention because "local prosecutors
have not always been ineffective in addressing local governmental corruption." Id. at 1079
n.242.
82
See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 5, at 1176-77.
83
Beale, supra note 70, at 1298.
84 Id. at 1298 (emphasis added).
85
73 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996).
86 The facts are outlined in detail in the dissent byJudge Daughtrey. See id.
at 1403-07
(Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
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§ 242, one of the three basic civil rights criminal statutes.8 7 It prohibits deprivation "under color of any law.., of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States."8 8 The theory of the prosecution was that the defendant's conduct constituted deprivation of the substantive due process
right to be free from "interference with 'bodily integrity.'m8 9 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the conviction en banc, and,
dividing sharply, reversed it.90
Lanier presents the Supreme Court with a host of important issues. The most obvious of these involve the scope of § 242 and the
possible need to confine it to avoid problems of lack of fair warning.
The Sixth Circuit majority believed that the statute cannot extend to
every official act that some court might find violative of some constitutional provision. 91 This approach would raise serious vagueness questions. The court held that § 242 applies only to rights whose existence
the Supreme Court has established as a general matter, and in "a factual situation fundamentally similar to the one at bar."9 2 The
Supreme Court may not wish to limit § 242 to this extent. The requirement of factual similarity raises a "catch-22" question of how the
Supreme Court could ever establish the specific right in the first
place. 93 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit rejected the use of a "shock
87
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994). The other two statutes are 18 U.S.C. § 241 ("Conspiracy
against rights") and 18 U.S.C. § 245 ("Federally protected activities"). See generally ABRAMs
& BE.AT, supranote 59, at 580-612 (discussing these statutes and the cases applying them).
88
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994). The major case in the statute's judicial development is
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (plurality opinion). Screws held that the requirement of "under color of any law" was satisfied if the defendants were exercising their governmental authority even if the particular exercise was forbidden by state law. Id. at 10711; id. at 114-15 (Rutledge, J., concurring); id. at 135 (Murphy, J., dissenting). This was an

important issue in the construction of federal civil rights statutes. See HART AND WECHSLER,

supra note 56, at 1105-19. Screws also grappled with the meaning of "rights ... secured or
protected by the Constitution." The plurality interpreted this term to apply to "a right
which has been made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or by decisions interpreting them." Screws, 325 U.S. at 104.
Lanier, 73 F.3d at 1388.
89
90 Id. at 1382-94. Seven judges joined in the entire opinion, with two additional
judges concurring in part. Six judges dissented in whole or in part.
91 Id. at 1392 (stating that " [o]nly a Supreme Court decision with nationwide application can identify and make specific a right that can result in § 242 liability"). The Lanier
court also rejected the use of lower court precedent on grounds of lack of notice and the
problem of variation of federal standards among different courts. Id. at 1392-93.
92 Id at 1393.
93 See id. at 1399 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Perhaps the
Court could establish the right in other contexts, such as in civil suits under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See id at 1401-02 (Jones, J., dissenting) (advocating the use of § 1988 precedents).
The question remains whether § 1983 decisions by lower federal courts, or even state
courts, could be treated as "establishing" federal constitutional rights. In addition, the
court's fact-specific formulation also runs counter to the practice of decision by analogy.
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the conscience" standard, 94 which has the potential to narrow the statute's frequency of application, but may increase the risk of vagueness.
One possible approach for the Court would be to limit the rights to
those established by its own decisions, but not to insist on identical
fact patterns. 95 This may satisfy the standard that the defendant knew
or should have known that his conduct violated an established constitutional right.
Laniermay emerge as a major federalism decision, particularly if
concern for state sovereignty pushes the Court toward a narrowing
construction. Professors Abrams and Beale have stated that the civil
rights criminal statutes are "most often used today for traditional civil
rights enforcement-to prosecute criminal conduct motivated by racial or similar prejudice or involving police brutality."96 These applications keep the statutes well within the bounds of established federal
interests, as discussed above. However, the same authors note increasing use of the statutes against "official corruption," and question
97
whether civil rights offenses will become a kind of "catch-all crime."
They refer to cases in which § 242 has been applied to extortion on
the ground that it is a deprivation of property. 98 One possibility is
that the Court will cite the potential for such broad applications as a
reason for keeping § 242 within defined bounds. This message would
be aimed as much at federal prosecutors as at lower courts.
One of the Court's main concerns in Lanier will be to prevent
§ 242 from becoming a general prohibition on the misuse of public
office. 9 9 Indeed, what is striking about the case is that it presents so
94 Id. at 1389 (noting the role of the jury in applying the "shock the conscience"
standard and raising problem of adequacy of notice).
95 Affirmance by the Court would not mean the end of such prosecutions. They
might, for example, be based on Equal Protection claims. See id. at 1393 (noting that "a
sexual assault raising an equal protection gender discrimination claim may present an entirely different case"). Cf United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2282 (1996) (striking
down state operation of a single sex educational institution). As an alternative the Court
may attempt to posit some a priori limitation on the rights to which § 242 refers. Neither
the constitutional nor the statutory text make this an easy task. Beyond the question of
constitutional rights, there is, of course, the issue of what rights are "secured or protected"
by federal statutes.
96 ABRAMs & BEALE, supra note 59, at 581.
97 Id at 581.
98 adt at 598-602. In United States v. Senak, 477 F.2d 304, 308-09 (7th Cir. 1973) the
court of appeals approved the indictment under § 242 of a public defender who exacted
money from impoverished clients. This case certainly presents the issues of generality to
which Professors Abrams and Beale refer. On the other hand, the defendant in Senak did
act under color of law and did deprive his clients of property.
99 The theme of misuse of office is found throughout § 242 jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 110 (1945) (plurality opinion) (police officers' power
"misused"); id. at 113 (Rutledge, J., concurring) ("gross abuse of authority"); id at 129
(Rutledge, J., concurring) ("abuse of their office and its function"); United States v.
Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1414 (6th Cir.) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (judge "dishonored his
profession"), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996). At the same time, those judges con-

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:225

many of the issues that lie at the heart of the debate over whether to
use the mail fraud statute to guarantee honest services: the scope of
the federal criminal law, federal control over abuse of state and local
offices, vagueness, narrow construction of broad statutes, the use of
common law methodology in federal criminal cases, and the problem
of vesting extensive discretion in federal officials when prosecution of
their state and local counterparts is at issue. As a result, Lanierhas the
potential for significant repercussions far beyond its particular
context.
The decision will almost certainly shed further light on the extent
of the general federal interest in controlling the behavior of local officials. With respect to corruption, perhaps this interest can be analogized to a violation of the civil right to participate in the governmental
process.10 0 Equal access to government services should be available to
all citizens. Yet corrupt governments do not serve citizens on an equal
basis. Some have greater access than others.' 0 ' Access is skewed in
favor of those with the resources to wine, dine, and bribe. Democratic
processes thus do not operate in an open, even-handed manner. In
making this analogy, one might invoke a generalized concern for
equal protection of the laws or specific issues such as denial or dilution of the franchise. 10 2 Fighting corruption can thus be seen as another example of the familiar federal interest in protecting individuals
frozen out of the political process. The problem with the analogy is
that it seems limitless. Taken to its logical extreme, the analogy implies that the national government would have an interest in intervening whenever state or local government was somehow unfair. Positing
a general interest of this magnitude-as opposed to limiting the interest to the specific area of civil rights enforcement-is totally at odds
with a federalistic view of states.
Alternatively, there may be a national interest in protecting national property. Titie 18, § 666 of the United States Code punishes
cerned with the potentially broad scope of § 242 are likely to invoke federalism. See, e.g.,
Screws, 425 U.S. at 141-49 (dissenting opinion). Lanier may present the Court with a difficult choice between federalism and women's rights. Cf. Lanier, 73 F.3d at 1399 (Keith, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing "the insensitive tone and lack of compassion permeating the majority opinion").
100 Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (upholding the justiciability of a claim that
malapportioned legislative districts dilute voting rights and may violate the Equal Protection Clause).
101 Ensuring equal access to government services is a fundamental goal of conflict of
interest laws. See Beth Nolan, PublicInterest,PrivateIncome: Conflicts and ControlLimits on the
Outside Income of Government Officials, 87 Nw. U. L. Rrv. 57, 71-81 (1992) (outlining the
goals of conflict of interest regulation).
102 In formulating these possible concerns I rely heavily on ethics-law analysis, as illustrated in the work of Professor Nolan. Two readers of an earlier draft-Professor Barry
Friedman and Assistant United States AttorneyJoseph Savage-offered helpful insights on
this point.
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bribery in certain cases where the governmental entity receives federal
funds of more than $10,000.103 Here there is a direct federal interest
in the honest administration of federal funds.' 0 4 In other instances,
general criminal statutes such as those dealing with false income tax
filings, 0 5 money laundering, 10 6 or securities violations'07 may expose
corrupt acts by state and local officials. But Congress passed three
statutes aimed, in part, at political corruption, and such legislation
forces us to confront directly the question of why the national government cares about this type of crime.
One anticorruption statute is the Hobbs Act.' 08 It provides that
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce,
by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits
or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
(b) As used in this section(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of offi09
cial right.'

The Travel Act 10 provides, in part, that
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the
mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent
to(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
103
18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994). See ABRAMs & BEAT , supra note 59, at 233 (discussing statute). "The bribe must have been given in connection with a business transaction, or series
of transactions involving anything of value of $5,000 or more." Id. To the extent that
constitutional questions cast doubt upon the utility of the mail and wire fraud statutes,
§ 666 may play a greater role in the anti-corruption context. Indeed this statute appears
already to be emerging as a major component of federal anti-corruption efforts.
104
The Constitution grants Congress the power to disburse federal funds: "The Congress shall have Power to Lay and collect Taxes... to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .... " U.S. CONsr. art. 1, § 8,
cl. 1.
105 See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 297 n.9 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
106 SeeUnited States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d564,567 (11th Cir. 1995) (indicting a member
of the Atlanta Board of Education for mall fraud and money laundering in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1350 (1996).
107
See United States v. ReBrook, 837 F. Supp. 162, 164 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (indicting
the state lottery attorney for wire fraud and insider trading in violation of securities laws),
affd in part and rev'd in par 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 431 (1995).
108 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
109 Id. (emphasis added). See also ABRAMs & BEALE, supranote 59, at 198-224 (discussing the statute and its importance in corruption prosecutions).
110 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
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(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying
on, of any unlawful activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform(A) an act described in paragraph (1) or (3) shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both; or
(B) an act described in paragraph (2) shall be fined under this
title; imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both, and if
death results shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for
life.
(b) As used in this section ... "unlawful activity" means... extortion,
blibey, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which they are
committed or of the United States."'

Finally, the mail fraud statute proscribes, in part, "any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."" 2 It is
triggered whenever the mails are used "for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do."" 3 In response to
McNally v. United States," 4 Congress supplemented the basic statute
with the following definition: "For the purposes of this chapter, the
term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."" 5
These three statutes have represented the core of the federal
prosecutors' arsenal against state and local corruption."16 In terms of
111

18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994) (emphasis added).

112
113

18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).

Id. In 1994, Congress broadened the statute to include "any private or commercial
interstate carrier." Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.

103-322, § 250006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2087 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994)).
114 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
115 Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4508 (1988) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1346 (1994)). This language applies as well to the wire fraud statute. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (1994). The analysis in the Article applies equally to honest services prosecutions
under both statutes.
116 See, e.g., Moohr, supra note 2, at 154 n.6. Moohr discusses the roles of the mall
fraud statute, the wire fraud statute, the Hobbs Act, and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994). In this Article, I have not
given the wire fraud statute separate treatment because of its similarity to mail fraud.
Under both statutes the question of "honest services" will be the same. As for RICO, it is a
potentially powerful anticorruption weapon, perhaps too powerful. In most of the cases
discussed in this Article, prosecutors did not use it. But see United States v. Mandel, 591
F.2d 1347, 1352 (4th Cir.) (containing one RICO count in mall fraud prosecution), affd,
602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc). Use of RICO is, however, extensive. SeeABRAMS &
BEALE, supra note 59, at 475-76 (discussing, RICO anticorruption cases). The three core
statutes treated here (as well as wire fraud) are predicate offenses that can form the basis of
a RICO prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994).
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constitutional power, it may be possible to justify the statutes on the
ground that Congress can use its authority over commerce and the
mails to curb activitfes of which it disapproves, even if it could not
regulate them directly. 117 Before discussing issues of power in detail, I
think it is helpful to return to the possible federal interests. The question remains why Congress cares about bribery, extortion, or general
dishonest practices within another sphere of government. Why are
those matters not simply the business of the other sovereign?
For those who reject the Court's perspective, there are two responses worth noting briefly. The first is that the other sovereign is
not really a sovereign. States no longer occupy the coequal position
with the national government that they once enjoyed. In reality, the
United States is one nation; within that structure, the states are
roughly equivalent to field offices or subdivisions. 118 Thus, it is entirely natural for the one true sovereign to police its internal operations. The highly intergovernmentalized nature of the American
public sector demonstrates that dual federalism is long gone in fact as.
well as in theory. 119
An alternative analysis invokes what might be viewed as a dormant national police power. The best illustration is Professor Little's
concept of demonstrated state failure. 120 He presents it as a limiting
principle and recognizes the importance of federalism principles in
delineating the scope of national criminal law.' 21 However, one could
use the approach to endorse a form of variable national authority to
deal with any domestic problem that reaches crisis proportions. 22 In
a sense, that is why we have a national government: to do what the
states cannot. Thus the national government has a potential interest
in everything. At least in those instances when state authorities are
not responding, state and local corruption arguably fits within the
area of national interest. 23
117
118

See infra text accompanying notes 214-55.
For a useful discussion of this view of federalism, see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash,

Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957 (1993).
119 One way of looking at the intellectual currents favoring devolution to which I referred in the introduction is that they represent a form of counter-revolution in reaction to
this development. Professor Sullivan describes the current climate as "a dramatic antifederalist revival." Sullivan, supra note 8, at 80.
120
Little, supra note 30, at 1032, 1077-80.
121
Id. at 1066-67. Professor Little recommends "some presumption against federalizing criminal conduct that is already prosecutable by the states."). Id. at 1067.
122
Cf id. at 1032 n.12 (suggesting concept of varying areas of national and state concern). But see Beale, supra note 70, at 1297-98 (questioning criterion of criminal jurisdiction that supports federal intervention whenever states are viewed as not dealing
adequately with an aspect of crime).
123
See Little, supranote 80, at 1079 & n.242 and accompanying text. As noted, Professor Little would require a particularized inquiry into the effectiveness of state and local
action.
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Positing federal interests of these two sorts as a predicate to constitutional analysis makes considerably less sense than it did prior to
Lopez. After Lopez, the challenge is to identify national interests in
combating state and local corruption that are consistent with respect
for the role of states as somewhat separate and independent sovereigns. I have explored above the possibility of an equal access rationale.' 24 At this point, it may be helpful to consider an alternative:
national concern with confidence in governmental institutions. The
comparisons to white-collar and organized crime are a good place to
start: they are areas where federal law enforcement is well-established
and widely accepted. These crimes subvert basic institutions and public confidence in them. a25 Preserving public confidence in government is an important national interest.
In a democratic society, government rests on the consent of the
governed. If people come to view the government as not serving the
public, they may well withdraw their consent, whether through passive
actions, such as failure to vote, or more direct expressions of disapproval. Pervasive corruption can seriously undermine public confidence. 26 The Court recognized these considerations in United States
v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 12 7 a cornerstone of federal ethics

laws. That case refused to give a narrow reading to a conflict of interest provision that forbade persons with direct or indirect interests in a
private entity from representing the United States in transacting business with that entity. Particularly relevant is the statement that
[t] he statute is directed at an evil which endangers the very fabric of
a democratic society, for a democracy is effective only if the people
have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shat124
125

See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 5, at 1198 (discussing effects of organized crime). In the

case of organized crime, it should also be noted that individual states may not be able to
deal with the problem. This is a standard rationale for federal involvement in the area.
126
See, e.g., Michael W. Carey, Larry P. Ellis &Joseph F. Savage,Jr., FederalProsecutionof
State and Local Officials: The Obstacles to PunishingBreaches of the Public Trust and a Proposalfor
Reform (pt. 1), 94 W. VA. L. RExv. 301, 31--14 (1991); Kurland supra note 39, at 377 & n.26.
There is increasing concern among those who write about European affairs that lack
of confidence in governmental elites, including perceptions of wide-spread corruption,
can lead to social unrest. See, e.g., William Pfaff, France'sNew Pessimism Representinga Shift in
Thinking, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 30, 1996, at All; Lynne Terry, Clamorfor Change Echoes
Around Europe, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1996, at A14; see also David Brooks, The Right's AntiAmerican Temptation, WEEKLY STANDARD, Nov. 11, 1996, at 23 (analyzing the disenchantment of some conservatives with American institutions, particularly the judiciary, and discussing the possibly of various forms of civil disobedience). One analyst has written that, at
least in the nonwestern context, "widespread corruption should be viewed as an indicator
that a regime is shaky and that U.S. reliance on such a regime for any purpose may be
questionable, if not dangerous." STANLEY KOBER, CATO INST., Win Spy? THE USES AND
MISUSES OF INTELLIGENcE 6 (1996).
127 364 U.S. 520 (1961).

1997]

POST-L OPEZ ANAL YSIS

243

tered when high officials and their appointees engage in
activities
128
which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.
Obviously, the federal government has a strong concern for corruption among its own employees. This concern would provide constitutional justification for statutes addressing that problem. There
are at least three arguments for extending this concern to the state
and local level. The first is that corruption anywhere within the country has a ripple effect on government at all levels. People may come to
see "the system" as corrupt and withdraw their confidence from government as a whole. A second reason for concern is that state and
local governments function as crucial points of entry for office seekers
within the American democratic system. 129 The progression from city
councilor to state legislator to member of Congress is a frequent one.
Lack of confidence in the honesty and openness of state and local
governments may discourage participation in them, depriving the national government of much of its talent pool. A third consideration is
built upon the Framers' vision of two levels of government in perpetual competition with each other as a bulwark against tyranny. 3 0
Thus, as guardian of the constitutional order, the national government must act whenever corruption threatens to undermine its
"competitors."'31

It does not, however, follow that the federal government needs to
act against the entire potential gamut of corruption and misconduct
at the state and local level. Congress's apparent unwillingness to pass
a general anticorruption statute aimed at these levels of government
may stem from a recognition that federal interest in the matter has its
Id.at 562.
129 See Merritt, supra note 43, at 1574; see also STONE ET AL., supra note 17, at 133-34
(citing Professor Jesse Choper's argument that federal officials' experience in state and
local office ensures responsiveness to concerns of those levels of government).
130 According toJames Madison:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion
allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.
Hence a double security arises as to the rights of the people. The different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be
controlled by itself.
THE FEDERALIsT No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961). See Merritt,
supra note 43, at 1573-74. Given our constitutional evolution and the national government's built-in advantages, including the Supremacy Clause, there is no risk of the national
government being swallowed up by the states. However, the converse could happen.
131 For a general discussion of the role of each government in controlling actions of
the other, see AkhilReed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425 (1987).
In addition to the arguments for national interest offered above, it is possible to discuss the issue of corruption in economic terms thatjustify national efforts to deal with it.
For example, extensive corruption may have an adverse effect on economic growth. According to Stanley Kober "corruption rewards firms on the basis of their political connections rather than the quality of their products and other strengths valued in a market
128

economy." KOBER, supra note 126, at 7.
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limits. Beyond the state-oriented arguments for limits made above,
one should also note the relative absence of two of the principal arguments for federal action in domestic matters: the danger that competition among states will produce a "race to the bottom,"1 3 2 and the
lack of "externalities" that one state's failure to deal with the problem
imposes on other states.13 3
C.

The Mail Fraud Statute As a Special Case

Suppose one believes that the policy arguments advanced above
justify a federal role, but would limit that role to forms of corruption
that threaten the national interest in preserving democratic institutions and the public's confidence in them. How does the mail fraud
statute measure up in this light, particularly when compared to the
Travel Act and the Hobbs Act? Examination of the text of the three
statutes suggests a fundamental difference between the Hobbs and
Travel Acts, on the one hand, and the mail fraud statute, on the other.
The first two are limited in their applicability by reference to specific
crimes. In the political context, these crimes are extortion (Hobbs
Act) 134 and extortion or bribery (Travel Act).135 Thus any federal
prosecution would have to prove the elements of these specific
crimes.
132
See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 104. The widely used concept of a "race to the bottom"
posits that competition among states is undesirable in a variety of regulatory contexts.
Market failures result from interstate competition to appease regulated entities rather than
impose the level of regulation that a true national market would impose. Thus the national government must step in to impose uniformity. Professor Sullivan calls these actions
"corrective," and refers to the areas of "health, safety, or environmental measures" as exampIes of matters requiring national action. Kd Although corruption within states may
threaten national interests, it does not appear to result from competition among states to
attract the most corrupt politicians.
133 See generally GEORGE F. BREAx, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FIsCAL RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1967) (presenting major problems of intergovernmental finance in the
United States). The concept of externalities also rests on notions of market failure caused,
at least potentially, by interstate competition. In order to keep taxes low, a given state may
choose to fund a social service, such as welfare, at a lower level than the national political
process would choose. This can have external results on other states which become saddled with large, service-dependent populations. The national government might then step
in with a grant program to equalize the situation. In the case of corruption, spillover effects on neighboring states would appear to be minimal, except, perhaps, by example.
This negates another classic rationale for national intervention.
It is true that economic analysis suggests that corruption in any one state produces a
market failure there because the political-governmental processes yield a different mix of
public goods and services than they would if not skewed by corruption. However, the question remains whether such a situation justifies national intervention in that state. One
might posit a national interest in an aggregate level of public goods and services unaffected
by distorting influences such as corruption. This analysis, however, ignores the significance of states as separate entities.
134 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
135 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (1994).
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The mail fraud statute contains no such limits. Its operative term
is "fraud," a concept that the courts can, and do, define broadly.
"Fraud" need not be limited by the relatively fixed boundaries of the
criminal law, or even those of the common law at any particular point
in time. 3 6 The federal courts have a relatively free hand in defining
the concept. Congress increased this freedom substantially when it
added the "honest services" language.' 3 7 This language could take
the inquiry beyond traditional criminal categories such as bribery and
extortion into lesser offenses such as acceptance of gratuities, 3 8 and
beyond the criminal law into the general area of government ethics.
This textual difference is important. For example, it appears to have
played a significant role in Judge Ralph Winter's influential dissent in
United States v. Margiotta.'3 9 Judge Winter criticized the "limitless expansion of the mall fraud statute [which] subjects virtually every active
participant in the political process to potential criminal investigation
and prosecution." 140 He depicted mail fraud as a "catch-all political
crime" to which federal prosecutors resort "when a particular corruption, such as extortion, cannot be shown or Congress has not specifi141
cally regulated certain conduct."
Of course, bribery and extortion can be flexible concepts as well.
Either might be stretched beyond its core conduct to reach gratuities
offenses and influence peddling. 42 Indeed, Justice Thomas has criticized the Hobbs Act for having expansionist tendencies similar to
those which Judge Winter found objectionable in the mail fraud statute. 143 Justice Thomas made these observations in Evans v. United
States,144 a case in which the majority both broadened and narrowed
the scope of the Hobbs Act. On the one hand, the Court held that
the requirement of "inducement" in extortion cases either does not
136 See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896).
137 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994)).
138 See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 279 (D. Mass. 1995) (allowing prosecution of lobbyist, in part for mail fraud violations, on the theory that by giving gratuities to
legislators he deprived citizens of their right to the legislators' honest services), vacated, 85
F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996).
139 688 F.2d 108, 139 (2d. Cir. 1982) (Winter, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in

part).

140 Id. at 143 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141 Id. at 144 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
Judge Winter concurred in the defendant's conviction under the Hobbs Act for the same
conduct. Id. at 139.
142
See ABAMs &BEALE, supra note 59, at 198 ("The Hobbs Act now appears to be the
statute of choice in prosecutions for the acceptance of official gratuities by state and local

officials."). This comment was apparently made prior to the decision in Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
143 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 290-91 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
144 504 U.S. 255 (1992).

246

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:225

apply to public officials, 145 or that if it does apply, the official need not
initiate the transaction because "the coercive element is provided by
the pubic office itself."' 4 6 On the other hand, the Court emphasized
the importance of a quid pro quo as an element of the offense of
extortion. 147 It appears that the payment must be made in return for
the agreement to perform "specific official acts,"' 48 as opposed to a
generalized purchase of goodwill. 149 This quid pro quo requirement
may well represent a significant narrowing of the Hobbs Act. 150 Such
a narrowing would be consistent with the text of the Act.
Judicial and legislative development of the mail fraud statute has,
with one notable detour, moved consistently in an expansionist direction.' 5 1 Initially, the statute served to prevent the use of the mails to
carry instruments of fraud such as false advertisements of get-richquick schemes.' 5 2 The Supreme Court early on, however, stressed the
breadth of the concept of fraud?155 The 1970s saw a major judicial
expansion of the statute to political corruption through the doctrine
of "honest services."' 54 The theory was that fraud embraced a wide
range of dishonest dealings, including breach of fiduciary duties. 15 5
56
Because public servants owe citizens duties of a fiduciary nature,
breaches of those duties could constitute fraud. One can sense the
breadth of the honest services doctrine by sampling its various formulations in the Second Circuit's majority opinion in Margiotta: "intangi57
ble and abstract civil and political rights of the general citizenry;'
"fiduciary duty to the general citizenry not to deprive it of certain in145
146

Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 266.

147

Id. at 268; see also id. at 272-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment) (concluding that a quid pro quo is a required element).
148
149

Id. at 268.

150

SeeJane Fritsch, A Bribe's Not a Bribe Wen It's a Donation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1996,

But see id at 274-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
§ 4, at 1 (discussing federal prosecutors' problems in satisfying quid pro quo standard). See
generallyPeter D. Hardy, The EmergingRole of the QuidPro Quo Requirementin Public Corruption
Prosecutions Under the Hobbs Act, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 409 (1995) (discussing in detail
the doctrinal interplay between Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), and McCormick
v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991), and lower courts' application of these decisions).
151 See Henning, supra note 33, at 441-69 (tracing the development of the statute
through the 1994 amendment adding private interstate carriers).
152 See id. at 442.
153 See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896).
154 See Henning, supranote 33, at 460-62; Moohr, supranote 2, at 163-66; Podgor, supra
note 33, at 227.
155 See, e.g., United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1006-07 (2d Cir. 1980) (discuss-

ing the fiduciary duties of a private sector employee).
156 See United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 123-26 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying the
fiduciary duties of a public servant to a county political boss).
157 Id. at 121.
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tangible political rights;"' 5 8 and the "right [of county and town] to
have their affairs administered honestly." 59 During the 1970s and
1980s, the doctrine furnished the basis for federal conviction of all
60
sorts of state and local officials.'
In McNally v. United States,161 decided in 1987, the Supreme Court
overturned this substantial body of lower court precedent 6 2 and abolished the doctrine of honest services. The Court held that fraud
under the statute had to involve some form of property, rather than
"intangible rights, such as the right to have public officials perform
their duties honestly.' 68 The Court's analysis is surprisingly brief for
such a significant decision. It relied in part on the language of the
statute' 64 and in part on two canons of statutory construction-the
clear statement rule and the rule of lenity in criminal cases.' 65 The
Court also invoked general principles of federalism. 166 The potential
importance of the latter for future analysis makes it worthwhile to
quote the language in its entirety:
Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer
boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and
state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope to the protection
of property rights. If Congress
desires to go further, it must speak
16 7
more clearly than it has.
McNally must be read as a product of its time-a period when the
Court was bitterly divided over the extent to which judicially enforceable principles of federalism could limit federal statutes affecting states.
168
Two years earlier, Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority
held, narrowly, that there were few, if any, such limits. At the same
time, the Court was developing the requirement that Congress state
clearly its intent to curtail state and local prerogatives. 1 69 McNally rep170
resents an early, somewhat tentative, example of this development.
If McNally was terse, the congressional response was even more
terse. Without floor debate, as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
158

1&

159

Id at 126.

160

See, e.g., Henning, supra note 33, at 461 n.129.

161

483 U.S. 350 (1987).

162

See id.
at 368 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

163

Id. at 358.

164

See id. at 358-59.
See id. at 359-60 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971)).
See id. at 360.
Id.
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
E.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
For a discussion of the clear statement rule and its possible applicability to the
statute in its current form see infra text accompanying notes 566-606.
165
166
167
168
169
170
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1988, Congress added the following section to Title 18, to accompany
the mail and wire fraud statutes: "For the purposes of this chapter,
the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice
to defraud another of the intangible right of honest services." 17 1 Congress did not respond by enacting an anticorruption statute that singles out particular forms of conduct, 172 nor did it refer specifically to
state and local governments. Whether the Court will again narrow the
statute on clear statement principles is the subject of Part V of this
Article. Parts III and IV proceed on the assumption that this is not the
case and examine possible constitutional issues.
Let us treat the amendment as ratifying everything that the lower
courts had done in developing the honest services doctrine and inviting them to do more of the same. Viewed in this light, the mail fraud
statute differs from the Hobbs and Travel Acts in a number of respects. It is not limited to specified crimes. It extends beyond traditional crimes such as bribery and extortion to potentially the entire
realm of government ethics. Much of its content will not come from
Congress at all. Instead, a vast number of choices on the part of federal prosecutors, judges, and juries will determine the scope of "honest services."'173 A statute of this breadth, intruding so deeply on the
integral functions of state and local governments, ought to set off all
sorts of federalism alarm bells. The first issue is the basic question of
the national power to enact such a statute in the first place, especially
in the post-Lopez environment.

III
MAIL FRAUD AND NATIONAL POWER-SOURCES AND LIMITS
UNDER POST-LOPEZ ANALYSIS

A. A Settled Issue?
As recently as a decade ago, federalism-based objections to the
mail fraud statute seemed constitutional folly and were "routinely reject[ed] ."174 In McNally, all members of the Court seemed to take as a
171 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994)). For a recent judicial analysis of the legislative
history of the amendment, see United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1436-40 (5th Cir.)
(rejecting the view that the amendment overturned McNally with respect to public officials), reh'g en banc granted,91 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1996). But see Podgor, supra note 33, at
228 (arguing that amendment "effectively voided the McNally holding"); cases cited infra
note 605.
172 There have been repeated proposals, so far unsuccessful, for a new federal statute
to deal with state and local corruption. See, e.g., ABRAMs & BEALF, supra note 59, at 248-53;
Moohr, supranote 2, at 199-208.
173 See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 144 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Moohr, supra note 2, at 191-93.
174 Moohr, supra note 2, at 178. See, e.g., United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 758-59
(1st Cir. 1987).
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given congressional power to apply the statute to state and local governments in a broad, honest-services form. 175 . Congress's response
shows that it shared that understanding. The dominant view that federalism had little role to play as a judicially enforceable limit on any
congressional action was that expressed in Garcia. Indeed, as recently
as 1992, Justice Thomas,joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice
Scalia cited Garciafor the following proposition in a local corruption
case prosecuted under the Hobbs Act: "Our precedents, to be sure,
suggest that Congress enjoys broad constitutional power to legislate in
areas traditionally regulated by the States-power that apparently extends even to the direct regulation of the qualifications, tenure, and
conduct of state governmental officials."' 176 If these three staunch federalists don't see a problem, why should anyone else?
B.

Lopez and Its Significance

The answer is to be found in Lopgz177 and the renewed judicial
willingness to take seriously the basic questions of national power that
it symbolizes. Cases such as Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,178 New
York v. United States,179 and Gregory v. Ashcroft,18 0 as well as Justice
Thomas's dissenting opinion in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorntonl 8 are

examples of this approach. 8 2 Lopez itself struck down the Federal
Gun-Free School Zones Act on the ground that it exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. 83 That case has already been the subject of extensive analysis,' 8 4 but I wish to review
briefly several specific aspects of the decision and posit their signifi175 483 U.S. 350 (1987). Justices Stevens and O'Connor dissented on the ground that
the lower courts could develop the doctrine as a matter of statutory construction. Under
this view, Congress clearly had the power to enact the statute. The majority also appeared
to accept congressional power when they stated:
It may well be that Congress could criminalize using the mails to further a state officer's efforts to profit from governmental decisions he is empowered to make or over which he has some supervisory authority, even if
there is no state law proscribing his profiteering or even if state law expressly authorized it.
Id. at 361 n.9. See also Kurland, supranote 39, at 402.
176 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 291 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-54 (1985)).
177 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
178 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996).
179 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
180 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
181 115 S.Ct. 1842, 1875 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
182
For a detailed discussion of these cases see infra Part IV.
183
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, granting Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
184 E.g., Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions, 109 HARv. L. Ray. 13, 34-45 (1995). Professor, now Associate Justice Fried of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, views
Lope= as "at once a modest and a conscientious exercise of the Court's power." Id at 37.
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cance for the mail fraud statute. A fundamental aspect is the reaffirmation of dual federalism, what ChiefJustice Rehnquist referred to as
"first principles." 8 5 "The Constitution," he wrote, "creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers."' 1 6 All others remain with the
states. This constitutional scheme is far removed from any notion of a
national police power.' 8 7 A second aspect is that judicial review is
available to keep Congress within its constitutional bounds. This concept, under a cloud since Garcia,emerges most clearly injustice Kennedy's concurring opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined. 18 8 A
third important aspect of Lopez is that the Court applied these principles to an exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause and found it invalid.' 8 9 Previously, the commerce power had
seemed particularly resistant to judicial review,' 9 0 leaving Congress a
virtual free hand in any area where it might find any connection to
commerce.191
Finally, it is significant that Lopez involved a federal criminal statute. Commentators have noted the connection between the breadth
19 2
of the commerce power and the sweep of the federal criminal law.
For the Lopez Court, however, the criminal law dimension of the problem raised a red flag: incursion on traditional state power. 193 Chief
Justice Rehnquist brought dual federalism to bear by emphasizing the
states' "'primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal
law."1 94 Lopez creates a new constitutional dynamic under which the
Court will not take for granted the existence of national power. The
extent to which the federal law "seeks to intrude upon an area of
traditional state concern"' 95 seems to be a factor cutting against that
law's validity. Criminal laws dealing with state and local corruption
may be particularly vulnerable. As one prescient analyst wrote prior to
Lopez, "[A] ny fundamental reevaluation of the scope of the commerce
clause could have a devastating effect on the federal government's
1 96
role in prosecuting state and local official corruption."

185

Lopez, 115 S. C. at 1626.

186

Id.

187

See id. at 1631 n.3.
See id. at 1637-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1626.
See id. at 1689-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 1658-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Beale, supra note 30, at 982.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n.3.
Id (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)).
Id. at 1640 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Kurland, supra note 39, at 373.

188

189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
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Lopez and the Federal Criminal Law-Initial Stirrings

Lopez was handed down in April of 1995. Criminal defendants
were quick to see its potential. Since the decision, a number of federal criminal laws have faced challenges as to Congress's authority to
enact them. Results vary, but increasingly the trend, particularly in
the courts of appeals, has been to reject the challenges. 19 7 For example, courts have upheld the carjacking statute, 9 8 but not without dissent.199 Regulation of firearms that have moved in interstate
commerce has been upheld, 20 0 as well as regulation of machine
guns. 20 1 On the other hand, a court of appeals has held that a federal
arson statute cannot constitutionally reach a building whose main
202
connection with interstate commerce is the receipt of natural gas.
20 3
Courts have split on the validity of the Child Support Recovery Act,
and the Federal Access to Clinics Act, with parties challenging these
204
statutes tending to achieve greater success at the district court level.
The preceding is not complete, and it is subject to updating on a
virtual daily basis. Professor Merritt takes the position that the early
decisions "confirm that the courts will identify [Lopez's] distinguishing
features.., and treat [it] as a narrow, exceptional ruling." 20 5 In her
view, the major impact of Lopez may come in the form of narrow con197 See, e.g., United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[Lopez] has
raised many false hopes.").
198 See United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 158-60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
230 (1996); United States v. Hutchinson, 75 F.3d 626, 627 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
241 (1996); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 549-50 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 575-76 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995).
199 See Bishop, 66 F.3d at 590 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200 See United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 389-90 (11th Cir.), cert. denied; 117 S. Ct.
262 (1996); United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995).
201
E.g., United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 885-86 (7th Cir. 1996).
202 See United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1995). The case
should not be read as striking down the statute but, at most, as holding that it could not
constitutionally extend to the facts before the court. The arson statute contains ajurisdictional requirement that the property in question bear a relationship to interstate commerce. Cases like Pappadopoulos may simply represent a failure by the prosecution to
establish this element. See Daniel Weintraub, Resisting the Urge to Extend United States v.
Lopez An Analysis of Lopez Challenges to Federal Criminal statutes in the Lower Courts 1720 (1996) (unpublished seminar paper, Boston College Law School) (on file with author).
203 CompareUnited States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1362-63 (D. Ariz. 1995) (holding Act invalid because it exceeded Congress's authority to legislate pursuant to the Commerce Clause and violated the Tenth Amendment), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787, 790-91 (9th Cir.
1996), with United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1329-30 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding Act valid because failure to pay child support has an effect on interstate commerce),
affd, 95 F.3d 999, 1002-04 (10th Cir. 1996).
204
E.g., United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675, 680-88
(7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied; 117 S. Ct. 46 (1996); Huffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 81214 (W.D.N.C. 1996).
205
Deborah Jones Merritt, Commercel, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 712 (1995).
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struction of federal criminal statutes. 20 6 However, one should not be
too quick to dismiss the direct effect of Lopez on questions of internal
limits on the reach of the Commerce Clause. Lower courts will engage in a context-sensitive inquiry. To the extent that an underlying
activity looks like a traditional state matter (e.g., domestic relations)
or relatively noncommercial (e.g., the presence of a residential building), the court may lean toward a finding of invalidity. What has
helped push the carjacking cases in the other direction is the clear
relationship of vehicles to interstate travel and, perhaps, to the economy in general.
A particularly difficult problem for the lower courts is how to deal
with statutes that contain a 'jurisdictional element," 20 7 requiring the
particular case have a relationship to commerce. Justice Breyer predicted this problem in his Lopez dissent.2 0 8 The courts are uncertain
whether they can look at the class of activities of which the case before
them is an example 20 9 or whether they need to conduct a case-by-case
inquiry into the effect on commerce.2 10 Professor, now Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Associate Justice, Charles Fried has stated
that courts will take a stricter approach to jurisdictional element
cases. 2 11 However specific issues take shape, one can already see an
important general point. Cases questioning national authority to enact criminal laws would have been laughed out of court a decade ago.
After Lopez, they are taken seriously and sometimes succeed.
D.

Mail Fraud and Post-Lopez Analysis

The question that arises is how to apply post-Lopez analysis, in its
narrow sense of the initial existence of federal power, to the mail
fraud statute. Lopez is not directly on point because Congress passed
the law pursuant to the Postal Clause. 2 12 However, assertions of au206
207

Id. at 713.

Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (noting that the Gun-Free School Zones Act "contains no
jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm
possession in question affects interstate commerce").
208 Id. at 1664-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting existence of more than one hundred
statutes, including criminal statutes, that use the term "affecting commerce").
209 See United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 584 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 681
(1995).
210 See United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1995).
211 Fried, supra note 184, at 40. However, it is far from clear that lower courts have
gotten the message. In United States v. StiUo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 383 (1995), the court upheld Hobbs Act jurisdiction under the "depletion of assets"
theory. The view of such cases is that extortion affects commerce because the victim would
have to utilize funds that might otherwise be used for commercial purposes. See generally
ABRAMs & BEALE, supranote 59, at 220-21 (discussing this theory). But see United States v.
Collins 40 F.3d 95, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting "work disruption" rationale); Merritt,
supra note 205, at 715-17 (discussing narrow construction of Hobbs Act after Lopez).
212 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
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thority under any grant of power should now be open to question in
order to preserve the principle of a limited national government
which Chief Justice Rehnquist identified as fundamental. If it is a
stretch to go from "commerce" to regulating guns near schools, it may
also be a stretch to go from "establish [ing] Post Offices and Post
Roads"2 1 3 to criminalizing misconduct by state and local officials.
The classic rationale for the mall fraud statute is that Congress is
acting to protect "the integrity of the United States mails." 2 14 The
original statute, enacted in 1872, "appears designed to protect the
post office from being abused as part of a fraudulent scheme."2 15 A
good example would be schemes by "city slickers" to fleece gullible
country folk by mailing false investment materials.2 1 6 Once recognized, however, this power can take Congress a long way towards regulating indirectly activities which it could not otherwise regulate
directly. The best example of this is lotteries. 217 In Ex parteJackson,
the Court upheld Congress's power to exclude lottery materials from
the mail.21 8 The Court reasoned that "[t]he right to designate what
shall be carried necessarily involves the right to determine what shall
be excluded."2 1 9 Thus Congress could "refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public morals." 220 As the
latter quote suggests, the postal power contains the seeds of a mininational police power over a broad range of activities normally subject
to state regulation. 22 ' The Court was fully aware of this potential
when, thirty-nine years after Jackson it stated that:
[t]he overt act of putting a letter into the post office of the United
States is a matter that Congress may regulate.... Whatever the
limits to its power, it may forbid any such acts done in furtherance
of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can
222
forbid the scheme or not.
The fact that the United States owns the mails makes this broad
authority easier to accept, although it might not carry over to regula-

214
215

l.
E.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 365 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Henning, supra note 33, at 442.

216

See id.

213

See generalty Blakey, supra note 5, at 1222-38 (discussing lotteries and the Constitution). This Excursus, part of the Appendix to Professor Blakey's contribution to the Hastings Symposium, is reprinted from G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland, The Devekpment
of the FederalLaw of Gambling,63 CoRNrLL L. REv. 923, 927-43 (1978).
218 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
219
id. at 732.
220
I. at 736.
221
Congress considered the constitutional issues extensively. Blakey, supra note 5, at
1228 n.40, 1234 n.58. Although debate focused on Congress's power to regulate lotteries
chartered by the states, broader issues of federalism were in evidence.
222 Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393 (1916) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
217
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tion of private mail carriers or to regulation of wire transmissions.223
In light of Lopez, should there not be limits on boot-strapping uses of
the postal power?2 24 Arguing in McNally for the "honest services"
reading of the mail fraud statute, Justice Stevens trotted out the old
chestnuts about "protect[ing] the integrity of the United States
mails" 22 5 and the statute's focus "upon the misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs."2 26 The integrity that is really
at issue, however, is that of state and local governments. A small taila relatively insignificant mailing that is somehow related to a broader
range of actions 22 7-can wag a very large dog.2 28 Post-Lopez analysis
might suggest imposing limits on this use of the statute. Courts might
develop an approach that makes a concept like "effect on the mails" a
constitutional requirement 229 rather than a matter of statutory construction.23 0 Alternatively, the inquiry might focus on whether mail
fraud honest services prosecutions threaten dual federalism by intruding too deeply upon a "traditional" state sphere.
There is, however, language in Lopez that appears to validate the
"right to exclude" analysis underlying the broad use of the postal
power. Chief Justice Rehnquist identified "three broad categories of
23 1
activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power."
The Gun-Free School Zones Act required analysis under the third category: "activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce"
223
See Henning, supra note 33, at 468-76 (discussing private carrier amendment as
exercise of commerce power). The wire fraud statute also appears to rest on the commerce power. It refers to transmission "by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994).
224 I will limit the inquiry here primarily to honest services issues under the mail fraud
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, although the federal common law analysis I advocate in Part V
would result in the same reading of honest services regardless of the type of carrier.
225 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 365 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
226 Id. at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761,
767 (8th Cir. 1973)).
227 See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-15 (1989). This case perpetuates
the view that the mailing need only have a tangential relation to the scheme. The Court
might, of course, tighten this requirement. See id. at 723-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
result would be a reduction in mail fraud prosecutions generally, not just in those relating
to state and local corruption.
228 See Kurland, supranote 39, at 415 (stating that corruption cases reflect paramount
national interest in assuring honesty rather than concern for sanctity of commerce or
mails).
229 There is a possible analogy to actions "affecting commerce," at least if that concept
were applied vigorously. Thus an attempt to rob the mails would have an effect on them,
while sending matters relating to a scheme to defraud would not. As discussed below, such
a development is unlikely. See infra text accompanying notes 237-56.
230 See Henning, supra note 33, at 450-60 (discussing the role that broad construction
has played in the development of the statute). See also id. at 442 (detailing origins of the
mail fraud statute).
231
United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995).
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or "that substantially affect interstate commerce."23 2 However, the category that is relevant to the analysis here is the first: Congress's power
to regulate "the use of the channels of interstate commerce." 233 Chief
Justice Rehnquist cited, with apparent approval, the following language from Caminetti v. United States:23 4 "the authority of Congress to
keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to
23
question." 5
Coming from Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the heart of his Lopez
analysis, this is a surprising use of authority. Caminetti involved the
Mann Act, which prohibits the transportation of women across state
lines for immoral purposes.23 6 The conclusion that Congress could
use the Commerce Clause in such a national police power fashion had
come only after hard-fought battles on the terrain of federalism. The
key judicial decision was the Lottery Case.23 7 In a five-to-four decision,

rendered after two rearguments, 238 the Court upheld a statute prohibiting the interstate transportation of foreign lottery tickets. The majority conceded that Congress was regulating morality, 239 but rejected
arguments based on the Tenth Amendment.2 40 It was clear to the
majority that Congress was "invested with the power to regulate commerce among the several States [and so may] provide that such commerce shall not be polluted by the carrying of lottery tickets from one
State to another."2 41 The dissenters denounced the commerce rationale as a "pretext"2 4 2 for an exercise of a national police power 243 and
invoked the constitutional vision of a limited national government.2 44
The Lottery Case dissenters seem closer to the ChiefJustice's views
of federalism as he explained them in Lopez. In the Commerce Clause
context, however, the current Court appears willing to unleash the
Lopez weapon only if the regulated activity is purely intrastate in character.2 45 Such forms of regulation may pose a particular danger of
Id. at 1629-30.
Id. at 1629 (emphasis added). See Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings andJudiial
Signals: A Positive PoliticalReading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CAsE W. REs. L. Rnv. 757,
787-88 (1996) (discussing reach of the channels of commerce rationale).
234 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
235
Id. at 491.
236
18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1994).
237
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 821 (1903).
238
See id. at 325.
239
See id. at 357.
240 See id.
241
Id. at 356 (punctuation altered).
242
Id. at 372 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v, Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819)).
243 See id. at 365 (Fuller, CJ., dissenting).
244 See id. at 366 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
245
See Fried, supra note 184, at 40.
232
233
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national incursion upon state authority. In Lopez, the Court was able
to apply traditional analysis, but with a more rigorous definition of
commerce.2 46 The same analysis could carry over to statutes regulating intrastate activities that "affect" commerce.
It is not surprising, however, that the Court appears to have left
intact the broad framework of congressional authority under the first
two categories of regulation of commerce: regulating "the use of the
channels of interstate commerce;" 247 and regulating and protecting
"the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce." 248 To rethink them-to revisit the Lottery Case,
for example-would require a major alteration of existing doctrine
that Lopez did not effectuate. Any such revision would present major
difficulties. Examining whether a purported commercial regulation is
actually a "pretext" for control of morality would force the Court to
probe deeply into legislative motives. 2 49 Balancing the strength of national and state interests prior to finding the existence of national
power would be a serious departure from existing practice, although
balancing may be appropriate when the Court considers the more limited question of external limits on regulation of states.2 5 As for internal limits, the Court appears to have meant what it said in Lopez.
The same rationale ought to apply to the Postal Power. One can
view the mail fraud statute, in its honest services form, as valid under a
"channels of mall" analysis. Congress may well be regulating a subject
over which it has no power. Once an aspect of that subject reaches
the mails, however, Congress can regulate that aspect, even if the regulation takes it deeply into some otherwise off-limits domain of the
states. Post-Lopez analysis does not provide internal limits here. Tails

246
Under this view of Lopez, the disagreement among all members of the Court, except forJustice Thomas, was a relative!y narrow one concerning whether a particular activity could be classified as "commerce," rather than a fundamental debate over Commerce
Clause methodology.
247 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995).
248 I&
249
See Fried, supra note 184, at 40:

Given the plenary nature of the very idea of regulation, the search for motive... is properly discarded, not as too intrusive or difficult, but as irrele-

vant. The commerce power thus extends to forbidding the shipment of
certain goods for whatever reason-because they will damage the channels
themselves, or just because the use of those channels ought to be closed to

them.
(footnote omitted); STONE
pretext approach).

ET AL.,

supranote 17, at 162-63 (discussing problems with the

250
See infra text accompanying notes 414-20 (discussing balancing interpretation of
National League of Cities v. Usey, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
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can wag dogs under both the commerce and postal powers; Jackson2 51
253
and Badders2 52 are still good law.
Still, one should not forget about Lopez completely when it comes
to the question of initial congressional power to enact an anticorruption law like the mail fraud statute. Even a few years ago most people
would have thought that decision improbable at best. I take a broad
view of post-Lopez analysis in its general sense, but subscribe to the
narrow view of the decision's precedential weight for similar questions. 254 One should always be prepared, however. Chief Justice
Rehnquist may have been laying the groundwork for a broader reexamination of national power. The Court has until now accepted far
more extensive applications of the Postal Clause to protect the mails
than the hypothetical extensions that Chief Justice Marshall found
"necessary and proper" in McCulloch v. Mayland.2 55 It may, therefore,
be advisable to consider the possibility of an alternative source of national power to enact a broad anticorruption statute.
E.

An Alternative Source-Guarantee Clause Analysis

In a major treatment of the federal role, 256 Professor Adam Kurland identifies the national interest in public confidence in government as part of the rationale for viewing the Guarantee Clause 257 as a
2 58
source of national power to deal with state and local corruption.
There are a number of distinct advantages to the Guarantee Clause
approach. It avoids the happenstance aspect of federal prosecutions
that rely on the presence of "commerce" or use of the mails, when
neither is the real issue. 25 9 The Clause is part of an Article of the
Constitution that limits states in several ways.2 6 0 Its phraseology-ExparteJackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
It is perhaps possible to allow Congress more latitude under the Commerce Clause
because this power is more central to the ability of the national government to function.
254
See Fried, supranote 184, at 37 (characterizing Lopez as "modest and a conscientious
exercise of the Court's power"). See also id.at 41 ("Justice Souter's complaint that the
Court was setting out on a doctrinal course that would lead straight to Lochner has a distinctly 'Chicken Little' quality about it.").
255
In McCulloch v. Maryland,17 U.S. (4Wheat.) 316,417-19 (1819), ChiefJustice Marshall developed the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause. He used as an example the
postal power and argued that it would be necessary and proper for Congress to penalize
theft of mail even though this might not be regarded as indispensable. As noted, it is a
large step from such protections of the exercise of a power to using that power to enact
legislation concerning morality.
256
Kurland, supra note 39.
257 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
258 See Kurland, supra note 39, at 376-77 (discussing the national interest in public
confidence in government).
259
See id. at 415-16.
260 Article IV also contains the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1,
and the original Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
251
252
253
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"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Governent .... "2 61-strongly implies congressional power to implement the guarantee. 262 The Framers were
concerned with honesty and virtue in government 2 63 Finally, Congress may answer federalism-based objections to exercises of national
authority over states when it acts under a specific power that implies
2
altering the federal-state balance. 6
Despite these strong points, I find the Guarantee Clause a problematic source of national power to deal with state and local corruption.265 The Clause seems designed for in extremis situations where
the basic form of state government has been altered. Extending it to
the control of everyday operations of state and local governments is a
considerable textual leap. Moreover, it represents a multiple finesse
of the concept of limited national powers that is central to post-Lopez
analysis. Indeed, part of that analysis, in its broad sense, reflects the
Court's recognition of the Guarantee Clause as a possible source of
limits on national power over states. Justice O'Connor cited the
Clause in Gregory v. Ashcrof/2 6 6 as authority for the importance of
states' determinations of the qualifications of their officials. 2 67 She
returned to the issue in New York v. United States,268 noting the Clause's
potential role in preserving state institutions and accountability from
the imposition of federal standards. 269 Academics have differing views
on the proper role of the Guarantee Clause, 270 but the influential
writings of Professor Deborah Merritt analyze it as a state shield rather
271
than a federal sword.
Whether or not the Guarantee Clause thesis is persuasive, it helps
us to focus on whether the commerce and postal powers are sufficient
to authorize the current federal role in prosecuting state and local
corruption. With respect to the use of the postal powers in the mall
fraud statute, I believe that the initial answer to such questions is affirmative. Under the narrow version of post-Lopez analysis, one can
261
262

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
See Kurland, supra note 39, at 375.

263

See ii. at 424-35.

264 See id at 475; see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1976) (discussing
exercises of power under Fourteenth Amendment).
265 See Moohr, supra note 2, 184-85 (discussing, but indirectly rejecting, Guarantee
Clause thesis).
266 501 U.S. 452, 462 (1991).
267 Id. at 462-63 (citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)).
268 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
269 Id. at 185-86.
270 See generallyIra C. Rothgerber,Jr., Conference on ConstitutionalLaw: Guaranteeinga RepublicanForm of Governmen4 65 U. COLO. L. Rxv. 709 (1994) (presenting the range of academic views on the Guarantee Clause).
271 E.g, Merritt, supra note 43, at 1583-84 (discussing the importance of the Guarantee
Clause as a basis for the "autonomy model of federalism").
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fairly find authorization for what Congress has done. Determining
the internal limits, however, does not end the inquiry under post-Lopez
analysis, which, in its broader form, requires consideration of external
constraints on enumerated powers. New York v. United States stands for
the proposition that federalism-based limits, seemingly nonexistent after Garcia,now play a role in constitutional analysis.2 72 In the context
of the mail fraud statute, they pose a serious problem.

IV
ExTERNAL LIMITS ON NATIONAL POWER AND POST-LOPEZ
ANALYSIS-FROM NA TIONAL LEAGUE OF CTiYiEs TO

NATIONAL LEA GuE oF 0L=Ys

A. Twenty Years Of Doctrinal Uncertainty
73
In 1976, the 5-to-4 decision in National League of Cities v. User)

sent shock waves throughout the constitutional law community.2 74 In
whatJustice Brennan decried as a wholesale abandonment of existing
doctrine, 275 the Court held that there are federalism-based limits on
congressional power to regulate states even when the regulation
2 76
would otherwise be a permissible exercise of national authority.
Garcia27 7 overruled NationalLeague of Cities nine years later, but strong
dissents kept alive the possibility of external, federalism-based limits
278
on enumerated powers.
Any theory ofjudicially enforceable external limits has to address
a number of criticisms, two of which are central: why is any such theory needed given the limited powers of the national government, and
what are the possible constitutional sources of the theoretical limits?
As to the first, Justice O'Connor has stated that the Court's willingness
to construe broadly the "limited" powers, especially the commerce
power, has created a constitutional imbalance that reverses the Framers' design.2 79 No one can deny the fact of expansion. However, if it
is an error, narrow construction of enumerated powers, such as oc272

See Candice Hoke, ConstitutionalImpediments to NationalHealth Reform: Tenth Amend-

ment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 489, 526-50 (1994) (discussing

importance of New York v. United States).
273
426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
274 See Hoke, supra note 272, at 527.
275
See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 875 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
276 See id.at 842.
277 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
278 See id. at 580-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also ia.at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
279
Id at 582-83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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curred in Lopez, might be the most direct way to correct it.280 Narrow
construction of particular powers may not really afford the states
much protection, as internal limits have proven to be difficult to enforce. As for external limits, the question of constitutional source is a
difficult one. National League of Cities suggested that the Tenth
Amendment may provide external limits, 2 81 and that constitutional
provision continues to play an important role despite its somewhat
tautological nature.2 8 2 In recent years, the Guarantee Clause2 8 3 has
emerged as a potential source, thanks in part to the writings of Professor Merritt,2 8 4 but this clause can also be seen as an instrument of
nationalism. 285 Even the federalistic wing of the Court has seemed
reluctant to attach great weight to it.286 Perhaps the answer is to be
found in "principles of federalism" 2 8 7 or in the structure of the Constitution itself.
It was obvious, even in Garcia, that the concept of external limits
would not die an easy death before the Supreme Court.2 8 8 Recent
decisions have shown that it is very much alive. That is why I refer to
post-Lopez analysis, in the broad sense, as embracing the concept, even
though Lopez does not, on its face, present the question.28 9 The possibility of external limits on congressional power over states is directly
relevant to the question of federal power to prosecute state and local
officials for governmental misconduct.
280
Lopez, of course, may not represent a substantial step toward narrow construction.
The importance of the decision may be symbolic, rather than a radical step toward a new
methodology.
281
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1976) (citing Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)), overnded by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
282 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992).
283
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
284 See, e.g., DeborahJones Merritt, The GuaranteeClause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1 (1988).
285 See Kurland, supra note 39, at 425.
286 See New York, 505 U.S. at 184 (1992). See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463
(1991).
287 SeeYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49-54 (1971).
288 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. TransitAuth., 469 U.S. 528,580 (1985) (RehnquistJ.
dissenting); see also id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
289 The fact that ChiefJustice Rehnquist did not even cite the Tenth Amendment is
indicative of the extent to which the decision is, on the surface at least, a narrow one.
However, once one recognizes its symbolic nature-and the early reference to "first principles," United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995), is clear evidence of this symbolism-a broad use of the term "post-Lopez" seems appropriate. See Lynn A. Baker,
ConditionalFederalSpendingAfter Lopez, 95 COLUM. L Rxv. 1911, 1919 (1995) (referring to
the "post-Lopez era"). There are possible overtones of external limits analysis in Justice
Kennedy's references to an area of "traditional state concern." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1641
(Kennedy, J., concurring). The concept of traditional state functions was central to National League of Cities' identification of limits to the exercise of enumerated powers.
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The Recent External Limits Cases

1. New York v. United States-An Uncertain Trumpet
The obvious candidate for invocation at this point is New York v.
United States.2 90 Of the four Supreme Court cases I will discuss, New
York is one of two that struck down a congressional statute on constitutional grounds. 291 However, the holding has potentially broader ap2 92
plicability than the holding in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
which is based on the Eleventh Amendment At issue in New York was
a section of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1985293 which the Court interpreted as requiring states, under certain conditions, either to "take title" to radioactive waste within their
borders or to regulate nuclear waste as Congress directed. 294 The majority viewed the statute as incompatible with Congress's inability to
"commandeer[ ] the legislative processes of the States by directly com295
pelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program."
Justice O'Connor, for the majority, drew on the nature of our "concurrent" federal system, 2 96 under which each government acts directly
on the people in its areas of power.2 97 The states are not "mere polit2 98
ical subdivisions of the United States."
The key to Justice O'Connor's opinion is her emphasis on accountability. 299 She viewed as essential the ability of citizens of each
state to determine which level of government is responsible for a particular regulatory decision. This permits the democratic process to
function effectively at both the state and federal levels. Congressional
commandeering would blur these lines because citizens might not
know which level was responsible.3 0 0 This dimension of the opinion is
a clear step toward some state sovereignty and a possible restriction of
Garcia.3 0 ' However, Justice O'Connor's analysis weakened this thrust
considerably by suggesting that the question of sovereignty-based lim290

505 U.S. 144 (1992).

291

Id. at 188. The other case is Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114

(1996). For a discussion of this case see infra text accompanying notes 335-49.
292
293

116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
New York, 505 U.S. at 149.

294

Id. at 174-75.

295

Id.at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.

264, 288 (1981)). Justice O'Connor later stated that "[w]here a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript
state governments as its agents." Id at 178.
296 Id.at 163 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991)).
297 See id at 163-66.
298 Id. at 188.

299

See id at 168-69, 182-83.

300

See id. at 168-69.

See Hoke, supra note 272, at 539 (analyzing New York as possibly undermining
Garcia).
301
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its on federal power is just another way of considering whether the
federal government has power over the subject matter in the first
place.3 0 2 This lack of distinction between external and internal limits
,on federal power is an obvious weakness of New York30 3 and may well
diminish its precedential force as a potential restoration of National
League of Cities.3 0 4 Indeed, one critic has already predicted that even30 5
tually "the decision will become a relic."
2.

New York in the Lower Courts

There have been significant efforts to apply the anticommandeering principle to federal legislation affecting the states. At this point I
consider two representative areas.3 0 6 The most conspicuous failure
came in the "Motor-Voter" litigation, notably Voting Rights Coalitionv.
Wilson.30 7 The National Voter Registration Act of 1993308 is a somewhat complex statute which requires states to increase citizens' opportunities to register for federal elections in a number of circumstances,
including when applying for a driver's license and doing business in
governmental offices dealing with welfare or unemployment 3 0 9 This
is a clear commandeering of state processes. However, the Constitution, while vesting initial power over federal elections in the states,
provides that "the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
[state] Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators."3 10
California invoked New York on the federal conscription issue, but
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit viewed Congress's specific
power over elections as distinct from the commerce power. The former, unlike the latter, "empowers Congress to impose on the states
precisely the burden at issue."3 1 ' The particularity of this constitutional language may limit this decision's impact on the general importance of New York. In addition, the court expressed federalism
concerns over burdens on California's procedures for regulating its
302
303
304

See New York, 505 U.S. at 159.

See Hoke, supra note 272, at 540-50.
See Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47
VAND. L. REv. 1623, 1652 (1994) (concluding that New York is "unlikely ... to be the
foundation of a useful constitutional law of federalism"). See generally Evan H. Caminker,
State Sovereignty and Subordinancy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal
Law, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1001 (1995) (providing a detailed analysis of New York and a
critique of the anticommandeering principle).
305
Tushnet, supra note 304, at 1653.
306 The anticommandeering principle has the potential to extend to a broad range of
subjects, particularly if it is not limited to legislative actions.
307 60 F.3d 1411 (9th dir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 815 (1996).
308 42 U.S.C. § 1973 gg-1-10 (1994).
309 See Voting Rights Coalition, 60 F.3d at 1413.
310
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
311
Voting Rights Coalition, 60 F.3d at 1415.
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own registration process. 312 Still, the case shows that a state's reliance
on New York may not carry the day.313 California won a partial rhetori-cal victory, and the holding can be distinguished, but as a practical
matter registration procedures for federal elections will probably apply to state elections as well. If the "Motor-Voter" litigation represented the only body of case law applying New York, New York's
importance thus far would be primarily at the doctrinal level.3 14
A more complex picture emerges from cases involving challenges
to the interim provisions of the Brady Act.315 This legislation establishes a system of background checks for firearms purchasers in certain states.3 16 During an interim period, local law enforcement
officials are to perform these checks. Thus, there is a federal commandeering of a part of the mechanisms of state political subdivisions,
a potential violation of the principles of New York. The district courts
have been receptive to this argument.317 However, in Mack v. United
States,318 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected it. The
majority was able to distinguish New York on the specific ground that
the Brady Act does not commandeer legislative processes,3 19 but the
opinion appears to rest on the broader conclusion that New York is not
a major generative case. The court emphasized that Garciais still the
guiding precedent in the area of federalism-based limits on the national government.3 20 The Ninth Circuit essentially treated New York
as a narrow exception to Garcia,321 applicable only in cases of "federal
coercion of a State's enactment of legislation or regulations, or creation of an administrative program."3 22 The court also engaged in a
312

See'id. at 1416.
Advocates of devolution viewed the "Motor-Voter" litigation as the source of a potentially important victory. See Reuben, supra note 7, at 79 (relating the litigation to the
"unfunded mandates" issue). However, the lower courts have not been receptive to their
arguments. In addition to Voting Rights Coalition, see Condon v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946
(D.S.C. 1995); Associationof Community Org.for Reform Now v. Miller,912 F. Supp. 976 (W.D.
Mich. 1995).
314
Even if this is all New York accomplishes, it is important that the national political
dialogue take place with the background understanding that federalism limits are real.
Such an understanding could certainly affect any debate over national health care legislation, as Professor Hoke demonstrates convincingly. See Hoke, supra note 272, at 550-73.
315
18 U.S.c. § 922(s) (1994).
316
See Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing the
313

statutory scheme), cert. granted sub nom. Printz v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996).
317

See, e.g., Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076 (D. La. 1995) (holding such

federal activity to be unconstitutional). See also Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030
(D. Vt. 1994) (same).
318 Mack 66 F.3d 1025.
319
See id, at 1030-31.
320
See id, at 1029 & n.6.
321
See id. at 1030.
322

Id.at 1031.
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degree of balancing, noting the slight degree of national intrusion,3 23
and indicated an unwillingness to review the national political process
to see if it had protected the states from overreaching by the federal
3 24
government.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite
result. Its decision in Koog v. United States325 struck down the interim
provision requiring local law enforcement to perform background
checks. The court relied heavily on New York and on the concept of
"implied limitations" on national power.3 26 It viewed the background
check requirement as "tantamount to forced state legislation."3 27 The
changes add to the duties that state law imposes on the relevant officials and, in effect, alter that law. The Fifth Circuit viewed the Brady
Act as "undermin[ing] state sovereignty" 3 28 and "blur[ring] accountability for" policy choices. 32 9 This obvious disagreement with the Ninth
Circuit 330 goes beyond the specifics of the Brady Act to the broader

issue of New York's doctrinal significance. The Fifth Circuit, at least, is
willing to read the case broadly as it demonstrated once again one
month after Koog. In Acorn v. Edwards,33 ' the court struck down part
of the Lead Contamination Control Act 3 32 because the statute re-

quired states to establish programs to remove lead contaminants from
school and day-care drinking water systems.
As is the case with Lopez, the direct precedential force of New York
is uncertain. However, the Supreme Court took a potentially major
step toward clarifying this uncertainty when it granted certiorari in
33 3
Mack to review the conflict among the circuits over the Brady Act.
There is a lot at stake. The Court might confine New York to the narrow context of commandeered legislation. On the other hand, the
case presents an excellent vehicle to extend the notion of external
limits on federal power. The Brady Act takes local personnel away
323
See id.at 1031-32 (accepting the possibility "that there is likely to be some point at
which a federal statute that enlists the aid of state employees can become so burdensome
to the State that it violates the Tenth Amendment").
324 See id. at 1033 n.10.
325
79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996).
326
Id. at 455. The court stated the issue in the following terms:
We now must decide whether the interim provision, when measured against
New York's guiding principles, encroaches on the sovereignty of the States in
violation [of] the Tenth Amendment, either by forcing the States to administer a federal regulatory program or by compelling the States to enact state
legislation according to a federal formula.
Id. at 457.
327 Id. at 458.

328
329

Id. at 460.
Id

330

See id. at 461-62 (outlining disagreement with Ninth Circuit opinion in Mack).
81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996).
42 U.S.C. § 300(j)-24(d) (1994).
See Printz v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 2521 (1996).
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from locally-prescribed duties, at local expense, precisely because the
national government does not yet have its own system in place. A decision striking down the statute would not have a significant practical
effect because a national system of background checks is scheduled to
be in operation by 1998.834 Its doctrinal impact would, however, be
great. Emphasis on local choice would be a logical extension of New
York. Emphasis on federal imposition of costs would sound a lot like
NationalLeague of Cities. Either way, a decision declaring the Brady Act
unconstitutional would substantially strengthen the notion that federal use of the commerce power to intrude upon the operations of
state and local government is suspect.
3.

Seminole-More ThanJust the Eleventh Amendment?

The Court also struck down a congressional statute in Seminole
Tribe of Floridav. lorida.335 At issue were the complicated provisions
of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.3 3 6 The Act permits a tribe to
sue a state in federal court if negotiations over a Tribal-State gaming
contract have been unsuccessful.3 37 Suits in federal courts against unconsenting states raise Eleventh Amendment problems.3 38 The Court
first considered whether it could avoid constitutional problems by statutory construction-a classic application of the "clear statement" approach.3 3 9 It found the statute unambiguous on this point.
The Court next considered whether Congress could authorize
such suits. Five Justices concluded that Congress could not. The
Court recognized the breadth of national power under the Indian
Commerce Clause. 34° An earlier decision appeared to hold that Congress's general power over interstate commerce allowed it to abrogate
state immunity from suit in federal court.3 41 However, the majority
reconsidered and overruled that decision.3 42 Seminole established that
the abrogation power Congress possesses when implementing the
Fourteenth Amendment does not extend to exercises of power over
commerce under Article I, section 8.
334 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Will HandleDispute OverInvestigatingGun Buyers, N.Y.
TiME, June 18, 1996, at A20.
335 116 S. Ct 1114 (1996).
336 25 U.S.C. § 2710-2721 (1994).
337 See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1119-20 (describing the statutory mechanism).
338 See generally ERwIN CHEME1NSIY, FEDERALJURISDICTION §§ 7.1 to 7.7 (2d ed. 1994)
(outlining Eleventh Amendment doctrine).
339 See Seminole; 116 S. Ct. at 1123-24.
340 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to "regulate Commerce
...

with the Indian Tribes").

341 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct 1114 (1996).
342 See Seminole, 116 S. CL at 1128.
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Eleventh Amendment doctrine is, to put it mildly, arcane. It
would be a mistake, however, to relegate Seminole to the footnotes of
federal courts. The decision is an important statement about federalism and a sharp manifestation of the conflicting views within the
Court about the nature of sovereignty within the American federal
union. For the majority, "each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system." 343 Being sued by one of its citizens in federal court represents an "'indignity.' 344 The dissenters, however, saw the matter
differently. According to Justice Stevens, "the sovereignty of the individual States is subordinate both to the citizenry of each State and to
the supreme law of the federal sovereign. ''345 Justice Souter's dissent
explores at some length the historical dimensions of the sovereignty
46

issue.3
What Seminole represents, in part, is another important step in the
current majority's elaboration of a post-Lopez vision of federalism.
The states possess significant attributes of sovereignty. The Constitution recognizes, implicitly and explicitly, that that sovereignty imposes
external limits on the national government's exercise of enumerated
powers. Observers were quick to see this aspect of the case and to
recognize its significance beyond the Eleventh Amendment context.
The New York Times gave the decision page one treatment.3 47 The
next day, a scathing editorial-entitled "Lurching Toward States
Rights"848-made the connection with Lopez. The Times cited Seminole
as the latest example of the current majority's "revolutionary, indeed
reactionary, interpretation of federalism, tilting the balance dangerously toward states' rights at the expense of federal power."3 49 Constitutional federalism is alive and well, even if by a margin of one vote.
One should not, however, fall into the trap of assuming that the
Supreme Court can only enforce federalistic limits in constitutional
cases.
4.

Gregory v. Ashcroft-A Crucial Step

The Court's most important swing away from Garciaand towards
a new Federalism 3 5 0 came in the purported statutory construction case
Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1124 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)).
345 Id. at 1144 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
346 1d. at 1165-73 (Souter, J., dissenting).
347 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Curb FederalPower to Subject States to Lawsuits,N.Y. TIMEs,
March 28, 1996, at Al.
348
N.Y. TIMEs, March 29, 1996, at A20.
349
Id. See also Greenhouse, supra note 334, at A20 (linking Lopez and Seminole as "two
major constitutional rulings that have curbed Federal authority vis-9L-vis the states").
350
It may be that each decade has its own "new federalism." The phrase achieved
considerable prominence during the presidency of Richard Nixon, particularly in connec343

344
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of Gregory v. Ashcroft.3 5 1 In 1974, Congress amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to "include the States as employers."3 52 The amendment also excluded a range of appointed
policymaking officials from the definition of "employee." 353 At issue
in Gregory was whether state judges are covered as employees, or exempt as policymakers. Writing for a majority of five, Justice O'Connor
5
found the Act "at least ambiguous" on this point.3
She then applied
principles of "clear statement" to conclude that the language should
be read as excluding judges from the ADEA.3 55 The way Justice
O'Connor brought these principles into the picture is a federalistic
tour de force.
She began with a paean to the federal system: "As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty
between the States and the Federal Government. 3 56 According to
Justice O'Connor, federalism is notjust in the Constitution; it is a fundamental structural means of securing important democratic values
on a par with the principle of separation of powers. 5 7 Through decentralization, federalism ensures "citizen involvement" and "innovation" in government. 5 8 It also protects against tyranny by either level
of government, at least so long as there is a "proper balance" between
the two.3 59 Because the federal government's Supremacy Clause
trump card threatens the balance, the Court must assume that Congress "does not exercise lightly" 3 60 the ability to "impose its will on the
States." 3 6 1
Against this backdrop, Justice O'Connor viewed matters of state
government structure as particularly important. "Through the struction with his efforts to change federal grant programs to increase state power. See RiCHARD
P. NATHAN, THE PLOT THAT FAiLED 18-34 (1975).
351

501 U.S. 452 (1991).

352

Id at 464.
See id. at 465. The Gregory Court quoted from 29 U.S.C. § 680(f) (1988):
"The term 'employee' means an individual employed by any employer except that the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified
voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's
personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate
adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of
the office."

353

Id.
Id. at 470.
See id. (asserting that "we will not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state
governmental functions regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to its Commerce
Clause powers or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment").
356
Id at 457.
357
Id. at 458.
358 Id.
359 Id. at 459.
360 Id. at 460.
354

355

361

Id.
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ture of its government, and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign."3 62 Because
the ADEA, if applied to judges, would intrude deeply on government
structure, it was appropriate to apply a requirement of "plain statement" before concluding that Congress intended for the Act to protectjudges. This rule of strict construction would govern regardless of
whether Congress had acted pursuant to the Commerce Clause or the
3 63
Fourteenth Amendment.
Labeling this approach one of statutory construction is a consid3 64
erable understatement. It elevates to "quasi-constitutional" status

those areas where Congress must satisfy the plain statement requirement before it can regulate states. Justice White, in dissent, argued
that this "attempt to carve out areas of state activity that will receive
special protection from federal legislation"3 65 was directly contrary to
Garcia.36 6 Perhaps the majority recognized that Garcia's invitation to
review the national political process to see if there had been a failure
to consider state interests3 67 was a hollow one. What Gregory amounts

to is a form of indirect review through the imposition of special requirements on legislation dealing with particular subjects. The result
is, nonetheless, a set of judicially enforceable federalism-based limits
on statutes dealing with those subjects.
Taken together, Gregory, New York, and Seminole demonstrate the
continuing vitality of the notion of external limits. Along with Lopez,
they show the desire of several Justices to emphasize dual federalism
as a general guiding concept. Moreover, these decisions do not stand
alone. One must also consider the important federalism dimensions
of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,3 68 even though it is not a case
about external limits on federal power.
5.

Term Limits and Federalism-BroaderImplications of Thornton

Thornton presented important federalism questions in the somewhat unusual context of a state attempt to exercise power over the
362

Id.

See id.at 470.
364 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking; 45 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1992), cited in Note, Clear
Statement Rules, Federalism, and CongressionalRegulation of States, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1959,
1960 n.6 (1994).
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 477 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
365
366 See id. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
367 See idat 464. See alsoGarcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588
(1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[w]ith the abandonment of National
League of Cities [by Garcia], all that stands between the remaining essentials of state sovereignty and Congress is the latter's underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint").
368 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
363
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national legislature. Arkansas, along with numerous other states, 369
had imposed limits on the number of terms members of its congressional delegation could serve. 370 Affirming the Arkansas Supreme
Court,371 the Supreme Court held in a 5-to-4 decision that state-imposed qualifications on federal representatives violate the Qualifications Clause of the Constitution. 372 Beyond this specific invalidity, the
Court condemned state-imposed term limits as violating fundamental
principles of democracy373 and as "inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the
United States."3 74 Both the majority and the dissent discussed extensively the Tenth Amendment and issues of state power in a federal
system.3 75 Justice Stevens, for the majority, viewed the Tenth Amendment as reserving to the states only those powers that they possessed
prior to the formation of the United States. 3 76 Since the federal government did not exist in the preconstitutional period, no power over
its representatives could be reserved to the states.3 77 According tojustice Thomas, in dissent, the scheme of the Constitution is that "the
Federal Government enjoys no authority beyond what the Constitution confers,"3 78 and all other governmental authority belongs to the
states.
What is crucial about Thornton, especially for the purposes of this
Article, is that the clash of views and visions within its pages extends
far beyond the issue of term limits to fundamental questions of federalism. As Professor Kathleen Sullivan puts it, "Term Limits is best read
as a preview of the Court's response to other coming controversies
over the relative reach of state and federal power." 3 79 Both the majority opinion and the dissent, as well as Justice Kennedy's concurrence, 38 0 can be read as endorsements of dual federalism. Justice
Stevens, for example, emphasizes the role of national legislators as
part of the national government-a role which essentially places them
beyond the reach of states. 38 1 In a sense, Justice Stevens uses Justice
O'Connor's earlier emphasis on the fact that the Constitution permits

370

See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 78 n.1.
See id. at 78; Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1845-46.

371

See id. at 1845.

372

See id.

369

373 See id.; see also id.at 1850-51 (drawing from Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969)).
374
Id. at 1845.
375
See, e.g., id at 1854-56; id at 1875-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
376
See id. at 1854.
377
See id. at 1855-56.
378 Id. at 1876 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
379 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 81.
380 See Thornton, 115 S.Ct. at 1872-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
381 See, e.g., id.
at 1858-59 (asserting that "[g]iven the Framers' wariness over the potential for state abuse, we must conclude that the specification of fixed qualifications in the
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the national government to act directly upon citizens against her.3 82
Justice O'Connor's conclusion was that Congress should not, and
need not, commandeer state legislatures when it can do the regulatory job itself. Justice Stevens's point is that precisely because these
national legislators are national, they must remain beyond the range
of state authority in such essential matters as their qualifications to
serve. Both views reinforce the notion that each government has a
sphere within which it is sovereign.
As for Justice Kennedy, he sided with the majority on precisely
such dual federalism grounds. For him, as forJustice Stevens, federalism would be threatened by state acts encroaching upon the national
"cpolitical capacity."383 However, he makes explicit what is at best implicit in the Stevens analysis: "That the States may not invade the
sphere of federal sovereignty is as incontestable, in my view, as the
corollary proposition that the Federal Government must be held
within the boundaries of its own power when it intrudes upon matters
reserved to the States."3 84 Moreover, as Professor Sullivan notes, one
must conclude that Justice Kennedy remains committed, as he stated
in Lopez,38 5 to judicial intervention "to protect each side from encroachment by the other."38 6 Finally, the extensive presence of the
Tenth Amendment in Thornton is significant. Justice Stevens, surely
no fan of the provision, spends fourteen pages-and utilizes sources
ranging from the Federalistto the Gettysburg Address-rebutting argu-

ments based on

it.387

For Justice Thomas, of course, the Tenth

3 88
Amendment is central to the Constitutional framework.
The recent decisions, and the Thornton dissent, represent a significant step back from Garcia toward the rehabilitation of the National
League of Cities' notion that there exists an inviolable zone of state sovereignty.38 9 Indeed, in Thornton,Justice Thomas cited NationalLeague

constitutional text was intended to prescribe uniform rules that would preclude modification by either Congress or the states").
382 See id at 1855 (citing FERO v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)). Justice O'Connor
elaborated on her view that the Constitution permits the national government to act directly upon citizens in her majority opinion in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 16366 (1992).
383 Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1872 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that "[i]t was the
genius of [the Framers'] idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state
and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other").
384 1d. at 1873 (Kennedy,J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995)).
385
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637-39.
386 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 103.
387 See Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1854-67.
388 See id- at 1876-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
389 See Hoke, supra note 272, at 529 (interpreting New York as a movement away from
Garciaand a revival of the Tenth Amendment'sjusticiability). Cf Sullivan, supra note 8, at
105 ("The Term Limits dissent might lay the groundwork for a revival of the doctrine of
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of Cities as if it were still good law.3 90 Whether things have reached this
point is not clear, but post-Lopez analysis calls into question national
laws that intrude upon the basic institutions of state government.
Such laws can now be attacked as impermissible federal regulation of
those institutions. Thus, the possibility of external limits on federal
anticorruption statutes applicable to state and local governments
needs to be addressed. The fact that federalism-based challenges have
not generally succeeded in the past3 91 may not be dispositive in the
future.
C.

External Limits and Federal Anticorruption Statutes-The
Case for Validity

With respect to external limits, the case most directly on point is
New York v. United States.3 92 However, the federal anticorruption statutes do not fit easily under the commandeering of state resources label. Although they apply to individual state officials, including
legislators, and thus affect the state government in a general sense,3 9 3
they do not require state legislatures to do anything. In addition,
these statutes do not impose a financial burden on states.3 9 4 However,
one should not proceed as if New York were the final word on federal
regulation of states.3 95 The case's broad thrust is a general endorsement of dual federalism coupled with a more specific emphasis on the
notion that "[s] tates are not mere political subdivisions of the United
States. State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government."3 9 6 Even if federal criminal
statutes aimed at state and local governments do not commandeer
state powers or resources, there is a basic incompatibility between the
assumption underlying such statutes-that the superior level may poNationalLeague of Cities, a repudiation of Garcia,or at least an extension of New York to new
contexts.").
390
Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
391 See, e.g., United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 758-59 (1st Cir. 1987) (discussing
and rejecting federalism arguments as well as citing other cases reaching same result).
392 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
393 It is, of course, possible to argue that prosecution of individual officials does not
regulate the states at all. See United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 1000-01 (6th Cir.
1982). In my view, the prosecution is inescapably a federal judgment about, and an intrusion into, the working of state government. The prosecutors are neither state officials nor
private citizens, as in a § 1983 suit, and the source of law is usually not state law.
394 In her very helpful analysis of New York, Professor Hoke emphasizes the decision's
impact on federal attempts to commandeer state resources to prevent depletion of the
federal treasury. Hoke, supra note 272, at 538, 542, 550.
895
Cf Tushnet, supra note 304, at 1652-55 (expressing the view that New York is unlikely to have significant force as a federalism decision).
396
New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
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lice the inferior one-and the federalistic implications of Justice
3 97
O'Connor's opinion.
Despite New York's implications for the protection of state sovereignty, however, there is language in the opinion that makes a fundamental distinction between the type of statute at issue in the case and
federal anticorruption laws. Justice O'Connor emphasized that New
York was "not a case in which Congress has subjected a State to the
same legislation applicable to private parties."3 9 8 A congressional requirement that a state pass a law has its direct effect, at least initially,
only on state legislatures.3 99 However, bribery, extortion, and mail
fraud through dishonest services are crimes that may be committed by
private citizens as well as public officials. 40 0 Once again, a narrow
reading of New York suggests that anticorruption statutes are not vulnerable to external limits on congressional power.
Limiting the case's principles to statutes aimed directly at state
legislatures will, indeed, keep New York within narrow bounds. It is
precisely for this reason that the limitation may not last. Justice
O'Connor appears to have relied on it mainly to distinguish adverse
precedent in which the Court had upheld federal statutes that regulated both state and private entities. 40 Even in New York itself, the line
was questionable. 40 2 New York's logic extends beyond commands addressed to legislatures. The notion of "'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty'" 40 3 can certainly reach federal criminal regulation of the
manner in which state officials govern sovereign states. The case is a
reaffirmation of state sovereignty that may presage a return to National
League of Cities.40 4 Thus, it seems desirable to examine the possible
impact of that case on the anticorruption statutes.
The essence of NationalLeague of Cities is that there are constitutional limits on the federal government's ability to regulate "the States
as States."4 5 This approach represents a zonal, or territorial, view of
state sovereignty. 40 6 Prosecutions of state officials might well fit within
the immune area. However, the zonal approach presents serious anaSee id. at 162-63.
Id at 160.
399 Obviously, there can be substantial, fairly direct, effects on regulated interests, as in
the case of the hazardous waste statute at issue in New York.
400
See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Perrin v. United States, 444
U.S. 37 (1979).
401
See New York, 505 U.S. at 160.
402 See id. at 201-04 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
403
Id. at 188 (quoting THE F)DERALuST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
404
See id at 201 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
405
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976), ovemded by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
406
See Merritt, supra note 43, at 1564-66.
397
398
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lytical difficulties. A particular problem with this concept is that it is
hard to delineate many spheres that the federal government may not
enter if the national interest is strong enough. It is no doubt true that
Congress cannot pass a statute directing the location of a state's capital, 40 7 but this is not the daily fare of government. Areas as diverse as
environmental regulation, civil rights, and job safety are full of ac408
cepted federal incursions on state sovereignty.
Apart from the incursion problem, there is the initial conceptual
difficulty of identifying the protected areas of state activity. Concepts
such as regulating the "States as States," 40 9 identifying indisputable
"attributes of state sovereignty," 4 10 and structuring "integral operations" 41 1 have proved hard to apply. In Garcia,when the Court's advocates of national power mustered the votes to overrule NationalLeague
of Cities, the majority criticized the earlier opinion as "unsound in
principle and unworkable in practice."41 2 In dissent, Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor predicted that the case would rise again.4 13 Even
if correct, the prediction need not mean that the second version will
be the same as the first.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, may have hit upon
the best way to make NationalLeague of Cities work:4 14 a balancing test
focusing on the extent of federal interest and the need for state compliance. 415 Before it was overruled, the National League of Cities approach evolved into a multi-factor balancing test.4 16 There are
See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
See NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985) (quoting
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981)).
Id (quoting Hode 452 U.S. at 287-88).
410
Id. (quoting Hode 452 U.S. at 287-88).
411
407
408
409

412

Id. at 546.

See id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
415 See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court's opinion... adopts a balancing
approach, and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection,
where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with
imposed federal standards would be essential.").
416
See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88
(1981).
The Brady Act problem currently before the Court, see Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d
1025 (9th Cir. 1995), cet. granted sub nom Printz v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996),
may lead to additional consideration of a balancing approach. A good example of this
possibility is the opinion of the Second Circuit upholding the Act in Frank v. United States,
78 F.3d 815 (2d Cir. 1996). The Frankcourt stated that, as a general matter, "the severity of
the burden placed on states is the touchstone for determining whether national legislation
is so onerous as to threaten the effectiveness of the States in our federal system." Id. at 826.
After examining the burdens imposed on local officials, the court concluded that the effort
required of them "is minimal, and the Act is therefore not unconstitutional by virtue of the
magnitude of the burden." Id. at 831.
413

414
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problems with any balancing test,4 17 and the question of whether state
interests could trump federal interests if both were strong remains.
The NationalLeague of Cities majority was troubled by federal requirements that "significantly alter or displace"41 8 state choices concerning
"integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." 41 9 This language suggests that the state interest might be
strong enough to prevail even if the inquiry is rephrased as one of
balancing. Of course, if some interests are absolute, identifying them
may not equate to balancing. Despite this uncertainty, a balancing
approach may be a more workable approach to resurrecting National
League of Cities than a zonal concept.
Let us assume that the Court will utilize some form of balancing
in identifying external limits on federal power over state governments,
and that corruption prosecutions trigger the inquiry into external limits. There are strong national interests in combating state and local
corruption. 420 As noted, these include the need to preserve confidence in government generally, the importance of state political
processes as entryways to the national process, and the federal government's concern for viable state competitors to check federal dominance. Whether or not these arguments rise to the level of support
for the existence of a constitutional power, they should weigh heavily
on the national side in a balancing process that focuses on how external, federalism-based limits operate on an enumerated power, the
existence of which is not in dispute.
In applying a balancing test to federal anticorruption statutes,
substantial arguments weigh on the state's side, beyond a general postLopez tilt in favor of dual federalism. Again, New York is the key guide
to the inquiry. Justice O'Connor emphasized accountability, and in
particular, the ability of state citizens to determine whether the state
or federal government was responsible for a particular program.4 2'
Accountability of public officials at the state level may be blurred if
officials at the federal level are setting and enforcing the standards for
official misconduct by state officials. 422 Applying federal standards
may displace state choices as to how to handle particular problems as
well as reducing the incentives for state officials to do their own polic417
SeeTushnet, supranote 304, at 1636-38; cf.Caminker, supranote 304, at 1019 (interpretingJustice O'Connor's concept of sovereignty as precluding balancing).
418
NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851.
419
Id. at 852. Under Hodel a court would inquire whether "the nature of the federal
interest ...justifies state submission." 452 U.S. at 288 n.29. Thus the inquiry had lost
much of its pro-state tilt.
420
See supra text accompanying notes 124-33.
421
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
422
SeeMoohr, supra note 2, at 175. But see Carey et al., supra note 126, at 314 (emphasizing necessity of federal prosecution).
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ing.423 As Geraldine Moohr points out, the long-term diminution of
the willingness of state citizens to effectuate reform themselves may
outweigh the short-term gains from federal prosecution.4 4 As in
other areas, states' responses to corruption may serve important "laboratory" functions.425 Views about what is appropriate behavior by governmental officials differ. Differences of views are a large part of what
federalism is about; it permits, and encourages, diversity of outcomes.
With respect to official behavior, states may legitimately disagree
about standards of conduct in a range of areas,4 6 severity of punish428
ment,427 or whether to utilize criminal or civil sanctions.
Viewing the matter as a state ethics official, however, I believe it is
wrong to assume that the state interests argue solely against the federal presence. Federal enforcement can play an important, even crucial, role. The problem is not a lack of state laws on the subject of
government misconduct.4 29 As early as 1974, thirty-eight states had
enacted conflict of interest legislation. 430 All states outlaw bribery in
the public sector.4 1 At least twenty-nine states have established ethics
423
424
425

See ABRAMs & BE.AL, supra note 59, at 248.

427

MASSACHUSETr7S SPECLAL COMM'N ON ETmics FiNAL REPORT 26-7 (1995)

Moohr, supranote 2, at 186-87.
See generally United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1641 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing role of states "as laboratories for experimentation to devise various
solutions" to problems).
426 For example, there may be a wide range of disagreement about how strictly to
enforce "revolving door" restrictions on former government employees who seek to deal
with government. For a discussion of revolving door issues see George D. Brown, The Constitutionas an Obstacle to Government Ethics-ReformistLegislationAfter National Treasury Employees Union, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 979, 1018-18 (1996).
(recom-

mending greater use of private and non-monetary sanctions) [hereinafter MAss. SPEcIAL
COMM'N REPORT].
428
See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.

ch. 268B, § 3(i) (West 1995) (directing State Ethics
Commission to serve as "the primary civil enforcement agency" for state's conflict of interest and related statutes).
429 But see Kuriand, supranote 39, at 377 ("[I]n many cases state anticorruption statutes have been ineffective or virtually nonexistent."). Cf Carey et a., supra note 126, at
304-09 (describing limits on state prosecutorial capacity). The same authors argue that
federal initiatives have prompted state laws. Id. at 316.
430

Kevin V. McAlevy, Note, Conflicts of Interest and State Legislatures: Vrrginia as a Case

Study, 5J.L. & PoL. 209, 213 (1988).
431
At.. CODE § 13A-10-61 (1995); AtsKA STAT. § 11.56.110 (Michie 1995); ARuz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-2602 (1995); Apiu CODE ANN. § 5-52-103 (Michie 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 68 (West 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-8-302 (1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-148 (1995);
DEL. CODE Am. tit. 11, § 1203 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-712 (1995); FLA. STAT. ch.
838.015 (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-2 (1995); HAw. REv. STAT. § 710-1040 (1995);
IDAHO CODE § 18-1352 (1995); 720 ILL. Ray. STAT. § 5/33-1 (West 1995); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-44-1-1 (West 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 722.1 (West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3901
(1995); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 521.020 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-118
(West 1996); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 602 (West 1995); MD. CiuM. I.Aw ANN. CODE,
art. 27, § 22 (1995); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 268A, § 2 (West 1995); MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 750.117 (West 1996); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.42 (West 1996); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-11-11 (1995); Mo. REv. STAT. § 576.010 (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-101 (1995);
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commissions or similar bodies. 432 Financial disclosure laws are also
prevalent.4 3 The problem lies in the realm of enforcement. As a
general matter, there are inherent limits on the ability of state entities
to enforce the law against other state entities. 434 State governments
are usually close-knit societies. 43 5 The potential enforcer and enforcee are often located in the same building or complex of buildings.
The former may depend on the latter for funding or for its very existence. One may view these cultural observations as somewhat abstract,
but they have a substantial real-world dimension.
In recent years, for example, the Massachusetts Legislature has
entertained attempts to abolish the State Ethics Commission, reduce
its funding substantially; and curtail its investigatory powers. 436
Although such frontal assaults are usually unsuccessful, there is a Perils-of-Pauline quality about the world of state ethics enforcement. In
1994, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the State
Ethics Commission lacked the power to compel testimony during its
"preliminary inquiry" into a matter. 437 Efforts to persuade the Legislature to overturn the decision have been treated as dead on arrival. 438
Viewed from this perspective, an alternative to state enforcement
mechanisms may be necessary,4 39 and federal efforts to enforce standards of governmental honesty can therefore be seen as advancing
important state interests. Thus, as a general matter, a post-National
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-917 (1990); NEv. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 197.020 (Michie 1992); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 640:2 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:27-2 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-24-

2 (Michie 1994); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 200.00 et seq. (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14217 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-12-01 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.02 (BanksBaldwin 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 382 (West 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 162.025

(1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4701 (West 1983 & Supp. 1996); RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-7-3
(1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-220 (Law. Co-op. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 22-12A-7
(Michie 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-102 (1995); TEX. PEN~tAL CODE ANN. § 36.02 (West
1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-103 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1102 (1995); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-439 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.68.010 (West 1996); W. VA.
CODE § 61-5A-3 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.10 (West 1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-5-102

(Michie 1995).
432

See STATESIDE

ASSOCIATES,

INC.,

Emics RuLES

OF

THE FiFIY

STATES

1995

(unpaginated).
433 See Note, Developments in the Law--Public Employment, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1611, 1660
n.72 (1984).
434 Kurland, supranote 39, at 377-78.
435 See George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts Perspective on the
State School FinanceDecisions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 543, 555 (1994).
436

See Brian C. Mooney, Old Ways DieHard in the Legislature, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 15,

1995, at 15; cf Carey et al., supra note 126, at 312 (detailing the legislative weakening of the
West Virginia Ethics Commission's authority).
437 See State Ethics Comm'n v. Doe, 631 N.E.2d 37, 38 (Mass. 1994).

438 See Brian C. Mooney, Flaherty Send-Off Worthy of a VTiking, BOSTON GLOBE, June 15,
1996, at 15 ("A full year has passed and the bill still gathers dust in the House clerk's
office."). As of this writing, a legislative hearing is anticipated in 1997.
439 This situation might be viewed as an example of Professor Little's principle of
demonstrated state failure. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23.
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League of Cities balancing test could well come out in favor of federal
anticorruption statutes. Different statutes, however, may fare
differently.
D.

The Mail Fraud Dilemma-Is This Statute an Affront to Both
Post-Lopez and Process Federalism?

One of the aspects of the mail fraud statute that critics most frequently denounce is its extraordinary breadth. 44 0 In the context of a
balancing inquiry, the fact that prosecutions under the statute can
have a far more intrusive effect on state governments than those
brought under the Hobbs and Travel Acts may be of particular importance. The latter are, at least in theory, limited to defined concepts
such as "bribery" and "extortion."44 ' Honest services, by contrast,
knows few limits. General statements to this effect abound. One federal court of appeals referred to the statute as aimed at "schemes
deemed contrary to federal public policy."44 2 A frequent formulation of
what this policy means is found in the following guidelines from another circuit court: schemes that "are contrary to public policy and
fall to measure up to accepted moral standards and notions of honesty
and fair play."44 3 The same court indicated that the search for the law
444
is not limited by any "state or federal statute or [the] common law."
The result is a kind of federal common law of the sort that flourished
in the civil context under Swift v. Tyson.44 5 Erie" curtailed that approach'to civil cases. Federal common law crimes are even more suspect,44 7 although the process of "interpreting" broad criminal statutes
can lead to their creation. That is one reason for limiting this process.
Numerous specific decisions bear out these general observations
about the scope of honest services. Cases using mail fraud theories to
prosecute irregularities in the elections process, such as failure to disclose campaign contributions from an underworld figure, 448 may be
beyond the reach of other federal anticorruption statutes. 44 9 In
440
See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 143 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
441
See supra text accompanying notes 143-50.
442
Margiotta,688 F.2d at 124 (emphasis added).
443 United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1360 (4th Cir.), affid per curiam, 602 F.2d
653 (4th Cir. 1979).
444 Id.
445 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18, 19 (1842).
446 Erie R.R v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
447 See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-34 (1812) (rejecting the notion of federal courts' power to establish common law crimes). But see infra
text accompanying notes 608-09 (discussing federal common law crimes under congressional delegation of authority).
448
See, e.g., United States v. Schermerhom, 713 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
449 Cf McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272-73 (1991) (emphasizing the importance of avoiding judicial interference with campaign practices).
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United States v. ReBrook,450 prosecutors applied the honest services analysis (under the wire fraud statute) to a scheme by a state official to buy
stock in a company which stood a good chance of landing a state contract. The defendant knew of the state contract because of his position as lawyer for the state agency involved. 45 1 The case certainly
presented important issues under the federal securities laws (with the
Fourth Circuit finding against the government)4 5 2 but hardly qualified as an example of bribery or extortion. Thus, having the honest
services doctrine available permitted a federal political corruption
prosecution that might not otherwise have been brought.
The broad reach of the honest services doctrine is particularly
important in the context of gratuities offenses. The gratuities offense
typically encompasses payments to a public official, in order to foster
possible favorable treatment, from a person who can benefit from that
official's actions. Unlike the crime of bribery, there is no quid pro
quo requirement that the payment be tied to a specific act. 455 Both
the payor and the payee can be guilty of the crime. 4 5 Prosecutors
may seek to fit gratuities cases under the label of "extortion" broadly
construed. 45 5 However, the Supreme Court's decision in Evans v.
United States4 56 appears to read a quid pro quo requirement into the
Hobbs Act.45 7 It may still be possible to use the Travel Act's reference

to "bribery ... in violation of the laws of the State in which committed."4 58 The theory is that Congress requires a state law that outlaws
the payments in question, but the state need not call the offense "bribery,"45 9 which is a federal term when used within a federal statute.
Even a state gratuities statute would suffice. 460 This analysis is suspect,
however. The Act appears to be a straightforward federal incorporation of state law. Even if one accepts a federal judicial role in defining
the ultimate meaning of a federal statutory term, it seems particularly
inappropriate to call gratuities offenses "bribery." Federal law itself,
450 837 F. Supp. 162, 166-67 (S.D.W.Va. 1993), modified, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 431 (1995).
451
See id at 170.
452 See United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 965-66 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the
application of the misappropriation theory of insider trading).
453 See ABRAMs & BFAT., supra note 59, at 225.
454 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
455 See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260-63 (1992) (discussing expansion of the
concept of extortion). In an extortion case, however, only the payee can be prosecuted.

456

Id.

457 See id. at 268-69; see also id. at 272 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (interpreting majority
opinion to require a quid pro quo as an element of the case).
458 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (2) (1994). The Travel Act also incorporates state extortion
laws. Id.
459 See United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969).
460 See United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 734 n.19 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v.
Gamer, 837 F.2d 1404, 1418 (7th Cir. 1987).
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when dealing with federal officials, distinguishes between the two
offenses. 46 1
The recent case of United States v. Sauye 6 2 demonstrates the importance of the honest services doctrine in applying the mail fraud
statute to possible corruption at the state level. Sawyer was a lobbyist
for an insurance company, a business heavily regulated by the state.
He had engaged in extensive wining and dining of state legislators. 46 3
The federal government brought a classic gratuities case against him,
utilizing the mail and wire fraud statutes as well as the Travel Act. If
the Travel Act analysis offered here were to prevail, that statute would
not be available. Such cases would be reduced to federal prosecutions
for giving gratuities to state officials. However, no federal statute
deals explicitly with this matter, although there is such a statute covering gratuities for federal officials. 4 64 Thus, the availability of the honest services theory plays a crucial role in such federal prosecutions. As
the gratuities issue illustrates, the mail fraud statute reaches so deeply
into state matters that a balancing inquiry might tip in the state's favor
based on the degree of federal intrusiveness.
Interfering with state control of state officials is particularly offensive to the post-Lopez emphasis on state autonomy and accountability
stressed in New York. 46 5 In addition to the degree of intrusion, one
should note that the federal government's role in prescribing rules of
honest services crosses the line between the classic criminal law and
rules of government ethics. Although its precise location is not clear,
such a line does exisL 466 Bribery and extortion are criminal law terms
of long-standing applicability both to government officials and to citizens in general. 46 7 On the other hand, there is ongoing experimentation in the area of government ethics with such concepts as limits on
the "revolving door"4 68 and prohibition of "appearances" problems. 469
Whether and to what extent such forms of conduct should be pun461 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994). The First Circuit recently compounded the analytical
problem by stating that some gratuities offenses are "bribery" for Travel Act purposes, but
some may not be. See Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 741 n.28.
462 878 F. Supp. 279 (D. Mass. 1995), vacated, 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996).
463 See id. at 281.
464 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
465 See Merritt, supranote 43, at 1570-73.
466 See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991) (distinguishing between
"ethical considerations and appearances" and "the federal crime of extortion"); McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 366 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
467 Thus, in Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), theJustices disagreed over the
meaning of extortion, but not about the venerability of the concept.
468 See, e.g., Ann McBride, Ethics in Congress: Agenda and Action, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
451, 470-74 (1990).
469 See, e.g., Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil
Paradoxes,44 STAN. L. RFv. 593, 595-603 (1992).
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ished are topics of intense debate. 470 The area is an ideal one for state
experimentation. As noted, this kind of "laboratory" federalism is one
of the values of the dual system that Lopez emphasizes. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion was explicit on this point.4 71

Allowing

state-by-state development of ethical norms represents an additional
reason why federal use of the honest services doctrine may simply go
too far in the post-Lopez era.
The analysis to this point of federal anticorruption efforts aimed
at state and local officials has focused on the impact of Lopez and similar cases. In the post-Lopez era, Garcia's model of process federalism
may well be dead, 47 2 but the case has not been overruled. Thus, it is
worth considering how that model would apply to the mail fraud statute. Garcia'smajority rejected the notion ofjudicially-enforceable limits on national power in the following terms: "the principal and basic
limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through
state participation in federal governmental action." 47 3 As Professor
Wechsler and others have argued, 47 4 there are a number of reasons to
rely on the political, rather than the judicial, process to protect federalism values. The principal rationale-that Congress represents the
states 4 7 5 -has weakened over time. 47 6 However, the visibility of the
national political process may protect against major alterations of the
federal system. 47 7 In addition, the slow and cumbersome nature of
the process affords protection as well. 478

Garcia's defenders on the

Court have expressed concern about efforts to undermine it,4 79 but
the anti-GarciaJustices purport to observe it. For purposes of this Arti470
See generally ABA Comm. on Gov't Standards (Cynthia Farina, Reporter), Keeping
Faith: Government Ethics & Government Ethics Regulation, 45 ADMIN. L. RE"v. 287, 296-308
(1993) (describing the ethical considerations involved in public service and recommending regulations and other methods to address these considerations).
471
See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1641 (1995) (KennedyJ, concurring).
472 See Merritt, supranote 43, at 1570-73 (noting that New York appears to represent the
abandonment of process theory).
473
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985).
474
See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Governmen 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 558-60
(1954).
475
See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-52 & n.11.
476
See, e.g., Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereigaty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 843, 862-67 (1979).
477
The inconclusive ending of the debate over national health care may represent, in
part, an example of this phenomenon.
478
The same point can be made here as well, perhaps more strongly. "Gridlock,"
known more favorably as "checks and balances," serves to protect federalism interests as
well as classic concerns for separation of powers.
479 See, e.g., Gregoryv. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 477 (1991) (White,J, concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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cle, the important point is that process federalism arguments bolster
the case against the mail fraud statute.
It is undeniable that the law of honest services comes mainly from
the federal courts. It certainly does not come from the statute itself.
480
Critics have viewed this aspect as presenting problems of vagueness
and separation of powers. 48 ' Having federal courts make basic decisions about how to conduct state and local governance also poses issues of process federalism. Federal judges are not elected. Federal
juries, which play an important role in honest services decisions, are
even less accountable. The extensive role of the individual United
States Attorneys in deciding what conduct to pursue as a violation of
the right to honest public services has also been noted.48 2 Although
these criticisms have usually focused on the dangers of politically-motivated prosecutions, 48 3 there is a process federalism dimension as well
when the decision is so far removed from any congressional direction.
The Justices who support Garcia have suggested that the Court might
respond to the extreme situation of a failure in the national political
process. 48 4 It is hard to picture the Court policing the congressional
process to ensure that Congress had adequately considered the states'
interests in formulating a rule of law to govern them. Under this view
of federalism, however, the Court might be willing t 9 tell Congress
that it could not delegate the major task of formulation to unaccountable entities. At the very least, process federalism considerations
make the constitutional status of the mail fraud statute even more
problematic, especially when added to post-Lopez concerns. Professor
Merritt analyzes the Court's jurisprudence since NationalLeague of Cities as articulating three approaches to protecting states from national
incursions: a territorial model, a process model, and an autonomy
model. 485 Under the analysis presented here, the mail fraud statute
presents problems under all three.
The substantial arguments in favor of finding external limits on
the statute lead to what I view as the mail fraud dilemma. On the one
hand, the Court might be persuaded to strike down the honest services component of the statute in its application to state and local officials. 48 6 The result would certainly be a victory for state autonomy. It
480

See Moohr, supranote 2, at 187-99; Podgor, supra note 33, at 269-71.

See Moohr, supra note 2, at 178-79.
See id.
483 See United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 143 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
484 See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988).
485 Merritt, supra note 43, at 1564-73.
486 Cf United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430 (5th Gir.) (construing statute as inapplicable to state and local officials and reserving constitutional question), rehkgen bancgranted,
91 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1996).
481

482
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might also enhance accountability in that state citizens would have
greater expectations that their own officials would respond to corruption and related issues. 48 7 It would not be the end of the world, because the Hobbs and Travel Acts 48 8 would still be available to federal
prosecutors. Such a decision might also prod Congress to pass a more
specific and comprehensive statute dealing with state and local
48 9
corruption.
On the other hand, federal prosecutions play an essential role in
efforts to deal with the state corruption problem. The states themselves, and their citizens, have an interest in this role. One may view
these prosecutions as alternatives to state mechanisms or as backstops
when the latter cannot function. Federal proceedings may spur the
passage of state statutes or other action. Either way, eliminating the
availability of the honest services doctrine would diminish the federal
role considerably. Whether these concerns would influence the
Court, or whether the Court would simply be reluctant to take postLopez analysis to the point of striking down a major statute in an area
of long-standing congressional concern, one should be hesitant to advocate this result. In sum, there are problems if the statute stays and
there are problems if it goes. Constitutional analysis and policy considerations result in a tie. In the next Part, I suggest greater recourse
to state law as a way out of this dilemma.
V
RECOURSE TO STATE LAW AS A WAY OUT OF THE DILEMMA

(AND A POSSIBLE RESPONSE TO VAGUENESS CONCERNS)

A.

Use Of State Law To Define "Honest Services"-Some
Theoretical Observations

Many of the objections to the mail fraud statute and its role in
federal anticorruption prosecutions of state and local officials focus
on the key concept of "honest services." 490 A possible response to
these criticisms is to utilize state law as the primary source of public
487

See Moohr, supra note 2, at 175.

488

See supra text accompanying notes 108-11. Federal prosecutors would also make

wider use of RICO and 18 U.S.C. § 666, as is already the case, as well as other, more general, statutes. However, limitations on the mail and wire fraud statutes would have an ef-

fect on the availability of RICO. These two statutes serve as "predicate offenses" for the
crime of racketeering that RICO penalizes.
489 See ABRAMs & BFAin, supra note 59, at 248-50; Moohr, supra note 2, at 199-208.
Consideration of any such statute would bring the federalism issues discussed here into the

open.
490 See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 140 (1982) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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officials' duties to serve honestly. 49 1 There would be no free-standing
federal norm to which federal authorities would give content based on
federal "public policy." Instead, the mails could not be used for
schemes which defraud citizens in the sense that they violate the federal policy against abetting violations of state law concerning the conduct of governmental affairs. As noted above, there is an extensive
body of state law on the subject.49 2 The Travel Act provides a possible
analogy.4 93 Federal judges can hardly claim unfamiliarity with handling state issues. In civil litigation, it is one of their major functions
under the regime of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 4 94 Recourse to state
law should answer any potential process federalism objections to the
mail fraud statute. The norm of conduct, usually found in statutes,
regulations, and administrative decisions, would come from state organs which obviously represent state concerns. In this case, one can
accurately say, quoting Justice Brennan's NationalLeague of Cities dissent with respect to acts of Congress, that the decisions are those "of
the States themselves." 495 As far as the source of law is concerned,
state defendants in a criminal case would be hard put to object to
having their own law used against them. As Justice Stevens has noted,
these officials are in a position where they should be expected to
know that law. 496 The fact that courts can and will expect state officials to know their state law of honest services is also highly relevant in
responding to the frequent vagueness objections that critics 49 7 and defendants49 8 have raised to the statute. These objections have considerable force. Strict construction of penal statutes and other basic
principles of the criminal law run counter to prosecuting a person for
what turn out, after the fact, to have been less than "honest" services.
On the constitutional level, these principles find their articulation in
the void for vagueness doctrine. 499 This doctrine ensures that citizens
491 Section 1346 is phrased in terms of the "right" to honest services. State law governing public officials' conduct can be viewed as creating the correlative duty that establishes the right.
492

493

See supra text accompanying notes 429-33.
See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979) (analyzing the role of state laws in

Travel Act cases).
494 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

495

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 876 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-

ing), ovemded by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
496 See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 375 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
497 See United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 142 (2d Cir. 1982), (WinterJ., concur-

ring in part and dissenting in part); Moohr, supra note 2, at 197-99.
498 See, e.g., United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 1350 (1996); United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 279 (D. Mass. 1995), vacated, 85 F.3d
713 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. ReBrook, 837 F. Supp. 162 (S.D. W. Va. 1993), modi-

fied, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 431 (1995).
499 SeeJoHN E.NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16.9 (4th ed.
1991).

284

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:225

will have fair warning of consequences before they act and also seeks
to contain prosecutorial discretion within defined boundaries. 50 0
The courts' response to vagueness challenges aimed at the honest
services requirement has been to point to the extensive body of federal judicial precedent interpreting it.501 Perhaps it is not too much
to expect potential criminal defendants to be aware ofjudicial precedent. 502 Furthermore, state officials, perhaps more than other citi-

zens, may be deemed to know that federal, as well as state, criminal
law can reach them. 50 The problem with "honest services" is that
what it means today is no sure guide to what it can mean tomorrow.
Tying the term to a particular state's law gives greater specificity and
limits, as well as strengthening prior knowledge by state officials of the
laws governing their actions. To the extent that vagueness challenges
to the mail fraud statute remain concern, recourse to state law can
provide answers to these, as well as federalism-based, objections.
In the post-Lopez era, however, the latter objections focus as much
on the who as on the what. That is, even if state law defines honest
services, federal officials are the ones enforcing it. This sets off alarms
both in terms of dual federalism in general and accountability in particular. To begin with the latter, federal enforcement of state norms
raises what might be called a converse New York problem. In that case,
Justice O'Connor expressed the concern that state enforcement of
federal law would leave citizens unsure as to whom to hold accountable. 50 4 I am proposing federal enforcement of state law, potentially

raising the same concern. Here, however, the fact that the source of
the law remains constant can further accountability. When federal officials enforce state law, citizens-particularly the press-will ask why
their own officials are not enforcing their law. They will understand
the who and the what; their focus will be on the why. I believe this
focus on enforcement roles will enhance accountability at the state
level. In particular, it will help to prevent situations where state governments set up elaborate anticorruption mechanisms only to have
state officials enjoy de facto immunity because of nonenforcement or
the prevention of enforcement.
See id&
See, e.g., Saryer, 878 F. Supp. at 291 (finding "that, when taken together, Section
1346 and the case law elaborating on 'intangible rights' mail fraud define the criminal
offense alleged in this case with 'sufficient definiteness'").
502
Cf Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973) (suggesting that officials
should be aware that their conduct violates a possibly imprecise statute when their "conduct falls squarely within the 'hard core' of the statute").
503
Cf McNally v United States, 483 U.S. 350, 375 n.9 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("When considering how much weight to accord to the doctrine of lenity, it is appropriate
to identify the class of litigants that will benefit from the Court's ruling today. They are not
uneducated, or even average, citizens.").
504 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
500
501
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Even if one accepts this accountability argument for federal enforcement, there remains the broader issue of dual federalism. In
Gregory, Justice O'Connor emphasized "a State's constitutional responsibility for the establishment and operation of its own government." 50 5
In the Eleventh Amendment context, the Court has stated that "it is
difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when
a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law." 50 6 As I have argued above, such dual federalism
concerns might negate any federal criminal law dealing with general
matters of state corruption. 50 7 Under a balancing test, the degree of
intrusiveness of the mail fraud statute may make it more vulnerable
than other federal statutes, even if state law is used as the reference
point for honest services. In my view, however, the prospect that enhanced state accountability can flow from federal enforcement illustrates that state interests cut in both directions. In an ideal world, we
would not need federal enforcement of state honest services norms.
Perhaps, however, federal enforcement helps us to get there. If so, it
serves short and long term goals at both levels of government. 50 8
There are a number of other theoretical and practical issues concerning the use of state law that need to be addressed. The first is
whether federal law in the area of governmental standards must be
uniform. 50 9 Under the scenario set forth here, federal law embodied
in numerous other anticorruption statutes would provide a national
"floor."5 1 0 Standards under these statutes would be uniform. However, this would not be the case with the mail fraud statute. It would
serve in part as an incentive to greater state enforcement of state law,
with federal prosecutors acting in a supplementary capacity. 51' A related issue is what to do when state law is unclear.512 This could be a
problem if, for example, state law is rarely enforced or if enforcement
takes the form of negotiated, private settlements. 51 3 Difficult ques505 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 462 (1991) (quoting Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 1 (1849)).
506 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).
507 See supra text accompanying notes 383-419.
508 But see Moohr, supra note 2, at 187 (arguing that federal intervention provides a
short-term solution to state and local corrupt practices at the expense of society's longterm interests).
509 See Kurland, supra note 39, at 480-83 (arguing for uniform federal standards in
federal anticorruption legislation and rejecting arguments for use of state law).
510 See supratext accompanying notes 108-15.
511 See ABAMs & B.ALE, supra note 59, at 248 (arguing that federal prosecution is a
"desirable second line of defense" in corruption cases).
512 See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 279 (D. Mass. 1995), vacated, 85 F3d
713 (1st Cir. 1996).
513 See MAss. SPECIAL COMM'N REPORT, supranote 427, at 26-27.
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tions will no doubt arise, as they do in civil litigation, but the use of
514
certification may be able to alleviate such concerns.
Another problem is that federal criminal prosecutions could upset a calibrated state enforcement system which relies heavily on noncriminal sanctions. 51 5 State enforcement officials, and potential
defendants, may be uncertain about how to proceed against a backdrop of possible federal criminal action.5 16 These uncertainties can
exist whether or not the federal prosecutors use state law. One answer
is for federal and state officials to further establish well-understood
5 17
working relationships in this area as they have in others.
Admittedly, use of state law to define the "honest services" component of mail fraud will create new uncertainties. For example, it
might tempt federal officials to intervene more deeply into such matters as "revolving door" ethics rules or campaign finance. The same
temptation exists, however, under the existing, open-ended federal
standard. In my view, use of state law has enough advantages as a
matter of federalism that it is worth a try. Examination of the cases
reveals the surprising conclusion that there is substantial support for
this proposal in existing practice.
B. Empirical Support for the Use of State Law-The Cases
The federal cases deciding the scope of the honest services doctrine under the mail fraud statute, as well as the wire fraud statute,
demonstrate an extraordinary degree of richness and complexity.
Rather than attempt to group them into neat categories, I find it most
helpful to analyze them as points on a spectrum. At one end-the
"federal law" end-are decisions that validate the standard view that
the only law in question is federal. 518 These cases either do not dis514
See Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. at 293 (noting defendant's argument that court should
certify certain questions of interpretation of Massachusetts gift statutes but declining to so
rule).
515 See ABRAms &BEALE, supra note 59, at 245 (analyzing penalty structures); cf.MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 268(B), §§ 1-8 (West 1996) (requiring financial disclosure of certain
public officials and employees and establishing state ethics commission for civil enforcement of conflict of interest law).
516 See ABRAMS & BEALE, supranote 59, at 248; see also infratext accompanying note 623
(discussing the federal common law approach to the "Sayerproblem"); cf United States v.
Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1433 (5th Cir.) (noting federal defendant's argument that alleged
conduct would be a misdemeanor under state law but was prosecuted as a federal felony),
reh'g en bane granted; 91 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. 1996).
517 See Stephen Kurkjian &Judy Rokowsky, State Planning Civil Suit Against Flynn Over
Funds, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 1996, at 1 (reporting on ajoint federal-state investigation of
former city administration). There have been numerous recent examples of close federalstate law enforcement cooperation in such areas as drug trafficking and street gang violence. One must recognize that developing such relationships becomes much more difficult when the state or local political establishment is the entity under investigation.
518 See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 758-59 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245,
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cuss state law5 19 or dismiss the need to consider it. In United States v.
States,520 for example, the court rejected federalism concerns over
dealing with state electoral issues, 52 ' and declared that the statute's
goal is to prevent the Postal Service from being used to carry out a
fraudulent scheme "regardless of whether it happens to be forbidden
by state law."5 22 The opinion described the role of the federal courts
in the following terms:
"The crime of mail fraud is broad in scope.... The fraudulent
aspect of the scheme to 'defraud' is measured by a nontechnical
standard.... Law puts its imprimatur on the accepted moral standards and condemns conduct which fails to match the 'reflection of
moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right deal5 23
ing in the general and business life of the members of society.'
At the other end of the spectrum are cases in which state law
plays the primary, even the only, role in determining the scope of
honest services. These cases represent a significant, albeit often implicit, judicial recognition of the serious federalism issues discussed in
this Article. In at least one case, the recognition was explicit. In
United States v. Schennerhom,524 Judge Goettel of the Southern District
of New York expressed his "federalist concerns" that federal juries are
being asked to make essentially "moral judgments about an official's
behavior."5 25 He called for limiting the statute's use to cases of conduct deemed illegal under state law.526 Because of the importance of
these cases, I will discuss the facts and analyses of several of them.
In Schermerhwrn, the defendant was a state senator charged with
receiving and failing to disclose illegal campaign contributions from
an underworld figure. In denying a motion to dismiss mail fraud
changes, the court emphasized that the conduct was illegal under the
NewYork Election Law.5 27 The opinion is somewhat ambiguous, however, as to whether state law is the sole source of the standard of
528
conduct.
1247-49 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1974);
United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764-65 (8th Cir. 1973).
519
See, e.g., Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 758-59. The conduct described in Silvano would have
raised serious questions under Massachusetts conflicts-of-interest law.
520
488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973).
See id. at 766-67.
521
522

Id. at 767.

Id. at 764 (quoting Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967) (alterations in original)).
524
713 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
525 Id. at 91 n.4.
526 Id
See id. at 91 n.4.
527
528
See id. at 88-89 (discussing good government and loss of salary theories).
523
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State law also constituted the primary frame of reference in
United States v. ReBrook 5 29 a wire fraud prosecution based on securities
trading by a state official whose position gave him inside knowledge.5 3 0 In dealing with the honest services issue, the district court
relied on the West Virginia Governmental Ethics Act, 53 1 both to establish that the defendant was a public employee and to determine his
fiduciary obligations. 532 Again the opinion is ambiguous in that it
leaves open the possibility that the defendant's duty of honest services
might also flow from his ethical responsibilities as an attorney or "his
inherent responsibilities as a West Virginia public employee."5 3 3 This
language suggests the possibility of a federal common law
53 4
approach.
The Massachusetts District Court left no such ambiguity in United
States v. Sawyer.53 5 The theory of the case was, in part, that a lobbyist
had engaged in a scheme to deprive Massachusetts citizens of their
right to the honest services of their legislators by giving them gratuities.53 6 The district court's analysis of the fiduciary duties of Massa-

chusetts legislators is based solely on state statutes and legislative rules.
Another case that appears to rest solely on state law is United States
v. D'Alessio.53

7

This complex case involved alleged misconduct by

county sheriffs. The district judge dismissed honest services charges,
which were based on receipt of gratuities. After an extensive review of
state judicial opinions, statutes, administrative provisions, and rules of
court,53 8 the judge concluded that a state court "could well decide

that the Rule does not apply to county sheriffs," and applied the rule
of lenity.53 9
A number of important cases fall in the middle of the spectrum.
Courts often purport to decide an honest services issue as a matter of
federal law, but end up utilizing state law as well. In United States v.
529 837 F. Supp. 162 (S.D. W. Va. 1993), modified, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 431 (1995).
530

See id. at 164.

See id. at 170 (citing W. VA. CODE §§ 6B-1-1 to 5 (1993)).
See id. (asserting that "when the Legislature sought to promote integrity and impartiality in governmental process by enacting the Ethics Act, it did not intend to exempt from
the Act's constraints those individuals, such as Defendant, whose terms of service may have
lacked a few emoluments of state employment").
531
532

533
584

Id.

For example, the court could use the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as a
source of law, regardless of whether West Virginia had adopted them.
535
878 F. Supp. 279 (D. Mass. 1995), vacated, 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996).
536 See id. at 281.
537 822 F. Supp. 1134 (D.NJ. 1993).
538 See id.at 1146-48.
589 Id at 1143. But see United States v. Faser, 303 F. Supp. 380, 384-85 (E.D. La. 1969)
(holding that an agent of a state has no right to gifts or gratuities as an agent absent an
agreement).
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Margiotta,540 the majority invoked state law to alleviate federalism concerns raised by the dissent.5 4 ' Judge Kaufnann asserted stoutly that
"we need not examine state law,"1542 and then went on to conclude
that the defendant's acts violated New York law as well as federal
law.5 43 Courts in other cases have looked to state sources to help determine the scope of the defendant's duties. A classic example is
United States v. Mandel,54 4 sometimes cited for the proposition that federalism concerns should not play a role.5 45 In discussing the duties of
the defendant, the Governor of Maryland, the court began with a standard federal common law analysis.5 46 It emphasized judicial power
and the view that state law is not controlling. 5 47 However, in analyzing
the defendant's obligation to disclose his financial dealings, the court
5 48
cited the Maryland Constitution and a state supreme court case.
One can find this mixture of state and federal law in defining the
defendant's duty as early as 1941 in Shushan v. United States.5 49 Shushan is the case which purportedly established that federal law is the
relevant law.5 5 0 Yet it examined in some detail the bearing of state
statutory law concerning conflicts of interest.5 51 State law crops up in
other cases in a variety of contexts. Courts have looked to state law to
establish a defendant's duty of disclosure.5 52 Prosecutors have used
state law to establish that the defendant acted willfully.5 53 And, reports suggest that indictments frequently make specific reference to
55 4
relevant state law.
As the discussion of the judicial approaches indicates, the role of
state law in honest services cases is in flux. The recent decision by the
688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982).
See id at 143 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 124.
543 See id.
at 124-26; see also United States v. Brennan, 938 F. Supp. 1111, 1119 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (describing Second Circuit approach in mail fraud fiduciary duty cases as "applying
federal law, drawing however, on the law of various states and the common law").
544 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), affid en bane per curiam, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979).
545 See, e.g. United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 758 (1st Cir. 1987).
546 See Mandel 591 F.2d at 1357-61.
547
See id.at 1361.
548 See id.
at 1363 (asserting that "[s]o far as relevant in this case, the Governor of the
State of Maryland is trustee for the citizens and the State of Maryland and thus owes the
normal fiduciary duties of a trustee, e.g., honesty and loyalty") (citing MD.CONST. Declaration of Rights art. 6; Kerpelman v. Board of Pub. Works, 276 A.2d 56, 61, cert. denied, 404
U.S. 858 (1971)).
549
117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941), amended by United States v.
Cruz 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973).
550 See Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1363 (citing Shushan).
551 Shushan, 117 F.2d at 120.
552
See United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 1975).
553
See United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 558-57 (7th Cir. 1975); see also Shushan,
117 F.2d at 120.
554
See, e.g., Mande4 591 F.2d at 1363; United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1247
n.2 (8th Cir. 1976).
540
541
542
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Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. SawyeP 55 may
compound the uncertainty. The defendant, a lobbyist, was convicted
of mail fraud, wire fraud, and other related charges. 556 The lower
court accepted the prosecution's theory that the defendant's violation
of the Massachusetts gift and gratuities laws sufficed to show a scheme
to deprive the state's citizens of the right to their legislators' honest
services. 55 7 The Court of Appeals, however, vacated the conviction.
As a general matter, the opinion expressed reservations about the use
of state law in honest services cases, citing the "complications" it might
cause.5 58 The court was particularly troubled by the theory that a violation of state law alone could suffice to establish a federal crime:
"[t]o allow every transgression of state governmental obligations to
amount to mail fraud would effectively turn every such violation into a
' 559
federal felony; this cannot be countenanced."
On the other hand, the court did not entirely rule out some use
of state law in circumstances like those in Sawyer. However, in addition to violation of the state statute, it required the jury to find intent
"to influence or otherwise improperly affect the official's performance of duties."5 60 This hybrid requirement-federal intent to violate a state
duty-could represent the kind of "complication" of which the court
warned. In fact, the court appears to have viewed the existence of
state law as irrelevant. As long as the defendant gave gifts with an
intent "to influence or otherwise improperly affect the official's performance of duties," the defendant committed fraud for purposes of a
federal criminal prosecution. 5 61 Indeed, the court suggested the insignificance of state law early in its analysis, 5 62 and had previously
5 65
placed itself at the federal law end of the spectrum.
Sawyer cuts both ways with regard to this Article's arguments.
Federalism concerns may be the source of the First Circuit's concern
85 F.3d 718 (1st Cir. 1996).
The prosecution also charged a violation of the Travel Act on the theory that violation of the state gratuities statute constituted "bribery" under the Travel Act. The court of
appeals appeared to agree with this theory. See id. at 734 n.19. This interpretation of the
Act is discussed supra text accompanying notes 459-61. However, the court vacated the
conviction on this ground as well, insisting on a "protective instruction" that the defendant's intent was to "cause the recipient to alter her official acts." Id. at 741.
557
See United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 279, 289-90 (D. Mass. 1995) (denying
motion to dismiss indictment), vacated; 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996).
558 Sauyer, 85 F.3d at 726.
559 Id. at 728.
560
Id. at 729.
561
The opinion makes clear the federal nature of the issue. "[F]or the federal honest
services fraud to be proven, the defendant must have the intent to affect a legislator's
performance of an official act and not merely to make payments in excess of some state
specified limitations." Id. at 732 (emphasis added).
562
See id. at 726.
563
See, e.g. ,United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 758-59 (1st Cir. 1987).
555
556
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for narrowing the scope of the mail fraud statute. The court's approach is to require a certain degree of perversion of the political
process before a federal criminal violation is found. This may be
sound policy, although there is some analytical difficulty in claiming
that violations of conflict of interest standards do not deprive the public of its right to honest services. However, Sawyer is a partial setback
for the state law approach advocated here. The court is correct that
federal law need not be compelled by state conceptions of official duty
in deciding what to criminalize. The harder question is whether federal law can delineate state officials' duties of honest services without
reference to state conceptions. Sawyer, although ambiguous, indicates
an affirmative answer. If the government had not brought state law
5 64
into the case, the judges would not have either.
Decisions from other courts manifest a range of views on the issue. The various forms of reference to state law in these decisions
represent more than lawyer-like concern with touching all the bases.
It is significant that even some federal courts that accept the doctrinal
premise that state law is irrelevant utilize it anyway. State law helps to
anchor a relatively open-ended exercise ofjudicial power and serves as
an implicit recognition of federalism concerns. Recent cases at the
"state law" end of the spectrum may represent a trend of increased
judicial awareness of the federalism dimensions of honest services
prosecutions. 56 5 This approach offers a way out of the mail fraud dilemma, which responds to the constitutional dynamics of the post-Lopez era. The question then becomes how to move the law further in
this direction.
C.

Toward Greater Use of State Law to Define Honest
Services-Clear Statement Analysis or Federal Common
Law?

In this subsection, I discuss two approaches. One would be for
the federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, to read
§ 1346566 as requiring that state law establish the scope of honest services whenever the defendant is a state or local official. Courts could
564 The prosecution may have thought that it had to utilize the state law provisions
because they imposed duties on the private parties. There are a limited number of circumstances in which courts view private citizens as public fiduciaries, see, e.g., United States v.
Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1982), but lobbyists do not seem to fall within
these exceptions. Sawyer, however, would not need to have any honest services obligations
of his own in order to deprive citizens of the right to their legislators' honest services. The
question would still remain as to whether state law was relevant to these services or whether
federal law could control the entire case.
565
See supra text accompanying notes 524-39.
566
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994).
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reach this conclusion through use of the "clear statement" rule. 56 7
Under this approach, "only an extremely well-targeted statutory statement [will] permit the Court to apply 'intrusive' federal statutes
against the states."5 68 Because § 1346 does not specify use of a federal
standard of honest services, a court would presume that Congress did
not intend to displace state law. As noted in the discussion of Gregoy
v. Ashroft, 569 the Court has relied on the "clear statement" rule to
foster a strong pro-state view of federalism. The rule is clearly
grounded in constitutional concerns. 5 70 The conservative members of
the Court may have seized upon it in order to counterbalance Garcia's
rejection of substantive limits on federal power.57 1 Moreover, the rule
certainly fits comfortably within the post-Lopez tilt toward re-establishing those limits.
Applying the "clear statement" rule makes sense in the general
context of the mail fraud statute. United States v. Bass,5 72 one of the
important early articulations of the rule, rests on a desire to limit the
scope of federal criminal law.5 75 Much of the rule's development has
occurred in Eleventh Amendment litigation. 5 74 These cases involve
using federal judicial power against states, which is somewhat analogous to the problem presented in mail fraud cases. Although the
Eleventh Amendment decisions permit damage suits against individual officers that might be compared to the criminal prosecutions at
issue here, 5 75 those suits often rest on the Fourteenth Amendment.
This grant of national authority over states is not present in the mail
fraud context. 5 76 The general thrust of the Eleventh Amendment
cases-limiting exercises of federal judicial power that infringe on
state sovereignty-is certainly on point.5 77 More specifically, Justice
567 See generally Note, Clear Statement Ruln, Federalim, and Congrecsional Regulation of
States, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1959 (1994) (advocating recognition of the essential role of "clear
statement" rules in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence).
568 William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law As Equilibrium 108 HAXv.
L. REv. 26, 82 (1994).
569 501 U.S. 452 (1991). See supraPart IV.B.4.
570
See Note, supranote 567, at 1962-63.
571
See id. (noting tension between Garcia and "clear statement" rule).
572 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
573

See id. at 349.

574 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
575 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 338, § 7.5.2.
576 The typical damages suit would be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute passed
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course, the analysis here assumes that there is
no separate national power over the operations of state government, such as that suggested
by Professor Kurland's reading of the Guarantee Clause. Kurland, -upra note 39, at 432.
577 Moreover, the analysis in this Article reflects the belief that a federal criminal prosecution of a state official for dishonest services intrudes upon state sovereignty. Thus, I
reject the reasoning that the prosecution does not affect the state because it is brought
against the official. See United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 1001 (6th Cir 1982)
(stating that prosecutions of individuals cannot affect "States as States").
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Thomas advocated use of the "clear statement" rule in Hobbs Act suits
against state and local officials. 5 78
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently used the clear

statement approach to invalidate the wire fraud conviction of a state
official. 579 The court went further than the resolution suggested, however, by holding that the reference in § 1346 to "the intangible right

of honest services" does not apply to the services of state and local
officials.58 0 The result appears to be that these officials cannot be
prosecuted for mail fraud unless the prosecution can show a scheme
involving property rights. 58 1 Indeed, the opinion's clear implication is
that § 1346 does not apply to private defendants without a similar
showing.5 82 In the Fifth Circuit, therefore, McNally is apparently still
good law and § 1346 may be a nullity.

The court reached this somewhat surprising result by first finding
ambiguity in the words "whoever" and "another"-the operative terms
of §§ 1341 and 1346 of Title 18.583 It reasoned that "whoever" could

not mean either a governmental entity or "the citizens of a state as a
body politic."5 84 "Another" might mean the same thing-as "whoever."
Presumably "another" thus does not mean whatever "whoever" does

not.585 The point seems to be that the language does not fit naturally
in the governmental services context. Whether the court found an
586
ambiguity or went to some length to create one is open to debate.

Regardless, the court concluded that "the language of § 1346 is not
It is true that in civil actions seeking injunctive relief against state policies the doctrine
ofExparte Young; 209 U.S. 128 (1908), permits a distinction between suits brought directly
against a state and suits against state officials. I see no reason to extend the Young fiction
to corruption prosecutions under federal law.
578 See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 289-92 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
579 See United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1439 (5th Cir.), reh' en banc granted,91
F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1996).
580 !d at 1437, 1440 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994)).
581 See id. at 1434 (recognizing that under McNally and Carpenterv. United States, 484
U.S. 19, 26-28 (1987), "both tangible and intangible property rights are protected by the
mail and wire fraud statutes").
582 See iL (noting that McNally "pull[ed] the rug out from under [private sector
cases]"). But see United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying statute in
private section context).
583 See id at 1435. Section 1341 refers to the use of the mails by the following- "Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or
promises...." 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994). Section 1346 provides that "[fl]or the purposes of
this Chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud includes a scheme or artifice to defraud another of the intangible right of honest services." 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994).
584 Brumley, 79 F.3d at 1435.
585 See id.
586 See it. at 1452 (Wood, J., dissenting) (describing majority's reading as "restrictive"
and concluding that an "ordinary" reading of § 1346 can include "a state citizen where the
perpetrator of the fraud is a governmental official acting in his or her official capacity").
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sufficiently clear on its face so as to eliminate the need for a look at
the legislative history of the passage of § 1346."587
In dissecting the legislative history, the court may be on surer
ground, although its opinion does not reflect the general view. 588
There were no committee reports or floor debates.58 9 The House appeared reluctant to adopt any of the Senate's specific proposals for
broad anticorruption legislation. 590 The court also showed strong
concern for the constitutional dimensions of honest services prosecutions. It emphasized repeatedly the federalism basis of McNally.5 91
Surprisingly, the majority opinion did not cite any of the other federalism decisions discussed here. However, it referred to the constitutional issue that would arise if Congress did reach out unambiguously
to address the general issue of misconduct by state and local
Officials.

5 92

If Brumley survives,5 95 its implications are far-reaching. First, it
would eliminate mail fraud prosecutions of state and local officials
under the honest services doctrine. In that situation, prosecutors
might argue creatively that dishonest conduct had led to property
loss. 594 Secondly, the status of private sector honest services prosecutions would be uncertain at best.595 Third, and principally, McNally
would remain good law. Indeed, at one point, the court stated that
59
Congress could not overrule it.Like the First Circuit in Sawyer, the Fifth Circuit was concerned
with the extraordinarily broad reach of honest services prosecutions
of state and local officials. The two courts, however, adopted sharply
587

Id. at 1435.

See, e.g., Podgor, supranote 33, at 228 (explaining that the amendment "effectively
voided the McNally holding").
589 See Brumley, 79 F.3d at 1346.
590 See id. at 1438-39. This inaction may reflect satisfaction with the extent to which
§ 1346 covers the problem, as well as other doubts about a broader statute.
591 See id at 1433-34, 1436.
592 See id. at 1442.
593 The decision was vacated and rehearing en banc was granted onJuly 17, 1996. 91
F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1996). At least two federal courts have disagreed with the Brumley analysis. See United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1283 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Cal. 1996). The Supreme Court may well decide the ultimate issue in Brumley, especially if it perpetuates this conflict. The case could become the
Fifth Circuit's next Lopez.
594 SeeMcNaly v. United States, 483 U.S. 350,377 n.10 (1987) (StevensJ, dissenting).
595 See Brumley, 79 F.3d at 1434 (noting effect of McNally on both public and private
sector cases); see also United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 773-74 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying
honest services statute to private sector breach of fiduciary duty).
596 See Brumley, 79 F.3d at 1437 ("[W]e know of no principle of constitutional law
which contemplates that the Congress can by simple legislative fiat overrule, overturn, nullify or render ineffective a decision of the Supreme Court."). Perhaps one should place
emphasis on the phrase "by simple legislative fiat" as an indication that Congress had not
done the job the right way. But see id at 1440 (expressing disapproval of the theory of
nullification by statute).
588
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different approaches to limiting the statute. The First Circuit focused
on the severity of the defendant's conduct, and its impact on the political process, as a limiting technique. The Brumley panel essentially
nullified the statute in the absence of a clearer statement from Congress. Whether the Fifth Circuit en banc adheres to this result will be
of great importance and may set the stage for Supreme Court consideration of § 1346. The Fifth Circuit may seek a middle ground under
which the statute applies to private action but not to state and local
officials. Private actors would be liable in the somewhat nebulous area
in which violations of the right to honest services do not rise to the
level of deprivations of property. This approach would give the statute some force, although an asymmetrical application would result.
This reading would be an alternative form of clear statement analysis,
analogous to the basic Eleventh Amendment principle that generallyphrased statutes do not, in that context, apply to states.
My clear statement proposal is even more modest give effect to
§ 1346, but construe "the intangible right of honest services" to refer
597
to duties created by state law when public officials are defendants.
There are, however, compelling reasons not to try any version of the
clear statement finesse here. This technique pushes judicial power to
its limits. As Professors Eskridge and. Frickey note, it is "institutionally
risky."598 The Court has already utilized clear statement analysis once
with respect to the mail fraud statute in McNally.599 To do so againto say that Congress did not get the message and must re-rewrite the
statute-might push judicial authority beyond its limits. An even
more fundamental problem is that it is not obvious that the statement
in § 1346 is unclear. The Court put Congress on notice that the honest services cases decided in the lower courts led to "involv[ing] the
Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials." 60 0 It also indicated that Congress could act without regard to state law. Congress responded by
passing § 1346, adopting the honest services standard. This is a term
of art; McNally seems to make its meaning dear.
It is possible to criticize Congress for not adequately considering
state interests in the passage of § 1346,601 but that is not the relevant
inquiry. On the other hand, there is some legislative history that sup597 It must be noted that this proposed reading also raises problems in the case of
private sector honest services defendants. Although principles of federalism are applicable

to federal regulation of private conduct, they are weaker than in the context of regulating
public officials.
598
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 568, at 82.
599 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987).
600
Id. at 360.
601
See Moohr, supra note 2, at 208.
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ports the view that it was passed to overrule McNally.60 2 However,
clear statement directs attention away from that history toward "evi60 3
dence of congressional intent ... both unequivocal and textual."
Thus, neither process nor history is dispositive. The question is
whether § 1346 meets the Court's standard. It does not mention suits
against state and local officials; the drafting could be clearer.6 0 4 Still,
it would seem a misuse ofjudicial authority to ignore the context in
which Congress passed § 1346. Virtually all lower courts have concluded that Congress did intend to reinstate the honest services doctrine. 60 5 Indeed, one circuit court has described § 1346 as the sort of
60
clear statement Congress sought in McNally.

6

Does rejection of the clear statement alternative mean that the
Court will have to bite the constitutional bullet and consider seriously
the arguments against the validity of the honest services statute as applied to state and local officials? 6 0 7 Perhaps that result is inevitable,
but I believe that courts can avoid it and have the best of both worlds
by incorporating state law under a modified federal common law approach. This is the second possible way to achieve greater use of state
law. It assumes that some degree of federal common law in the criminal context is permissible. One can view a broad statute such as
§ 1346 as congressional authorization to fashion it within the parameters of the state statutory terms. 60 8 The concept of "federal common
law" need not mean a total absence of state law. Lower courts have
already utilized state law in honest services cases, but they have not
generally been explicit about how they reached this result. In the private civil law context, courts have extensively considered the role of
602 1d. at 169 (referring to Representative Conyers' assertion, 184 CONG. Rac. H11, 251
(daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988), that § 1346 "restores the mail fraud provision to where [it] was
before the McNally decision").
603 Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989).
604 See generally ABRAMs & BEALE, supra note 59, at 137-88 (describing congressional
response to McNally).
605 See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.8d 933, 940 n.1 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing cases); see
also West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that McNally was "quickly corrected" by Congress).
606 See Byan, 58 F.3d at 940 n.1.
607 In this Article, I have emphasized the federalism arguments. However, the issues of
vagueness and improper delegation are also important. My colleague Sharon Beckman
has been very helpful in discussing the latter issue with me.
608 See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 812-15 (1896) (interpreting mail fraud
statute to permit broad judicial role in defining "fraud"). Indeed, the judicial approach
described in United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir. 1973), is a good example
of federal common law formulation. The relationship of statutory interpretation to federal
common law is a recurring theme in federal courts scholarship. See e.g., HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 56, at 755 ("Determining the proper role of federal common law is all the more
difficult because it cannot be sharply distinguished from statutory or constitutional interpretation. As specific evidence of legislative purpose with respect to the issue at hand
attenuates, interpretation shades into judicial lawmaking on a spectrum.").
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state law in federal common law adjudication. Judges in these cases
must first find authority to fashion federal common law, usually in a
statute or in the Constitution itself.60 9 The question then arises as to
whether state law can play a role.
A civil case that provides possible guidance is United States v. KimbellFoods, Inc. 610 At issue were the rights of the United States, as creditor, against the rights of other creditors of borrowers in default.
Because the underlying loans that were subject to the claims came
from federal entities, the Court held that federal law controlled issues
relating to those loans. However, it also held that federal courts
should "adopt state law as the appropriate federal rule for establishing
61
the relative priority of. . . competing federal and private liens." '
The Court saw no need for uniformity. Rather, it emphasized the importance of "intricate state laws of general applicability on which private creditors base their daily commercial transactions." 6 12 The same
analysis can apply to mail fraud cases. State law of honest services
exists and public actors rely on it in fashioning their governmental
conduct. 613 Federalism does not require uniformity.
The issue that Kimbell Foods raises is a recurring one in the civil
context, 61 4 and it can occur in the criminal context as well. The Federal Criminal Drug Forfeiture Statute61 5 (as well as its civil counterpart) 616 provides for the forfeiture of "property" related to drug
617
crimes such as the instrumentalities or the proceeds of an offense.
It provides for this forfeiture "irrespective of any provision of State
6 19
law, 6 18 and it contains a somewhat general definition of property.
609

See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
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363

(1943). See generaly

(discussing Clearfield
and the making of "federal common law"). The mail fraud statute with the honest services
amendment can, as noted, be viewed as a delegation to fashion federal common law. For a
general discussion of delegated authority to develop federal common law in the criminal
context, see Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 S. CT. REV. 345.
Professor Kahan discusses federal fraud statutes as an example of such delegation. Id. at
373-78; see also id. at 365-66 (discussing federal defendant's awareness of state law).
610 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
611
Id. at 717.
612
Id. at 729.
613
See supra text accompanying notes 429-33.
614 See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 348-50 (1966); DeSylva v. Ballentine,
851 U.S. 570, 580-82 (1956). See generallyWright, supra note 609, at 411-21 (discussing the
Erie Doctrine and the making of "federal common law").
615
21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994).
616
See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994).
617 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a).
618 Id.
619 21 U.S.C. § 853(b). This provision states, in relevant part, that "[p]roperty subject
to criminal forfeiture... includes (1) real property, including things growing on, affixed
to, and found in land; and (2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights,
privileges, interests, claims, and securities."
CHARLEs A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 412-14 (5th ed. 1994)
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Not surprisingly, a number of cases involving real estate have raised
difficult issues of who owned the "property" in question. So far, the
lower courts have tended to look to state law for answers.6 20 This result seems consistent with federalism values. Federal law decides when
a defendant's property is subject to forfeiture; state law determines
whose property it is. As with Kimbell Foods, the analogy to the honest
services problem is not complete. In the lien and forfeiture contexts,
federal law provides the basic norm, while state law guides one portion of the problem. In the honest services context, I am proposing
judicial borrowing of state law, without statutory direction, 62 ' to define the norm itself. Some may see this as an abdication of national
power. 622 However, if one accepts the analysis offered in this Article,
my proposal should be viewed as a healthy advance for federalism.
Finally, two related questions must be addressed briefly: the Sawyerproblem of state statutes whose breach federal law may not choose
to criminalize, and the possibility of inadequate or nonexistent state
law. Examination of the First Circuit's opinion in Sawyer suggests that
in many instances federal courts may not view state requirements as
meriting federal criminal enforcement. Here again, federal common
law points the way: if a federal court does not feel that the use of state
law is appropriate, it need not borrow it. There is a key difference,
however, between this modified federal common law and the Sawyer
approach. The court is not free to fashion afederallaw of honest services without a specific grounding in state-created duties. 62 3 Whether
or not there is a violation of these duties is the first step in honest
services analysis. What happens, however, if there is no state law to
borrow, or if it seems inadequate in a given case?624 One answer is
that that is the price we pay for federalism. States may fail. Nonenforcement leaves the matter to their political processes. The borrowing solution keeps the matter open. If federal officials can convince a
federal court that a particular situation is so offensive to federal inter620
See, e.g., ABaRAs & BEAT. , supranote 59, at 885-86 (discussing the use of state law in
federal forfeiture actions); KennethJ. Rossetti, Defining the Property Interest in the Federal Criminal Drug Forfeiture Statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853: Implications for Choice of Law and
for Federalism (1995) (unpublished seminar paper, Boston College Law School); see also
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 141-42, (1993) (KennedyJ., dissenting)
(speculating "whether the controlling law for transferring and tracing property rights of
the United States ... is federal common law").
621 By contrast, the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952(b) (1994), explicitly authorizes the use
of state law.
622
See Kurland, supranote 39, at 479-80.
623 There remains the analytical problem that the defendant would have denied the
public of its right to honest services by violating state laws defining that right, but would
not be subject to punishment under the federal honest services statute. The answer is to
be found in the word "federal." State sanctions for state duties remain available.
624 For example, the defendant might have engaged in a complex course of conduct,
of which state law addresses only a part.
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ests that the court should fashion a federal rule that is otherwise unavailable from another federal statutory source, federalism may well
permit this result. My preference is to avoid it, at least as long as
possible.
CONCLUSION

6 25
Federalism is one of those concepts that just won't go away.
Lopez symbolizes the current Court's commitment to federalism. The
extent to which the case will be a source of new doctrine is not yet
clear. However, its significance extends beyond the Commerce
Clause to contexts where, as an initial matter, federal power seems
present. Even here, the Court may find external federalism-based limits on the exercise of that power. It seems wise in the post-Lopez era to
reexamine long-held assumptions about the national role. Those assumptions are particularly open to question when the national government is regulating states and their subdivisions.
One area for concern is the federal prosecution of state and local
officials for corrupt governmental practices. This is a well-established
activity of the national government. So far, the courts have accepted
it. I foresee a change, however. These prosecutions place states
under a form of federal tutelage more suitable to political subdivisions
than to somewhat autonomous co-equal sovereigns. In this Article I
have examined the reasons why prosecutions under the mail fraud
statute are particularly problematic. That statute incorporates a broad
right to "honest services." It falls to federal courts, prosecutors, and
juries to define the contours of that right.
In my view, these prosecutions raise serious federalism questions,
particularly in the post-Lopez era. Federal enforcement of this wideranging federal norm is likely to encounter constitutional challenges.
Perhaps the Court will face the issue head on and resolve it. I believe,
however, that the federalism problem can be greatly alleviated by
looking to state law to define the content of honest services. Courts
might apply clear statement analysis to read the statutory reference to
honest services as requiring use of state laws. I believe that it is preferable to use a modified federal common law approach that requires
the existence of a state law duty as a first step in honest services analysis. Examining the cases reveals that there is considerable precedent
for this approach. Federalism objections have less force when federal
courts use state law. There remains the question of the desirability of
federal enforcement. In the long run, state enforcement of state law
625 For an excellent introduction to the federalism debate, see Symposium: Federalism's
Future, 47 VARD. L. REv. 1205 (1995), especially Larry Kramer's contribution, Understanding
Federalism, 47 VAN. L. ryEv. 1485 (1995).
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is the optimal approach. In the short run, however, federal enforcement may be a means of getting there.

